Stalin: From Terrorism to State Terror, 1905-1939 by Walz, Matthew
St. Cloud State University
theRepository at St. Cloud State
Culminating Projects in History Department of History
5-2017
Stalin: From Terrorism to State Terror, 1905-1939
Matthew Walz
St. Cloud State University, mawalz05@gmail.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/hist_etds
Part of the History Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of History at theRepository at St. Cloud State. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Culminating Projects in History by an authorized administrator of theRepository at St. Cloud State. For more information, please contact
rswexelbaum@stcloudstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Walz, Matthew, "Stalin: From Terrorism to State Terror, 1905-1939" (2017). Culminating Projects in History. 10.
https://repository.stcloudstate.edu/hist_etds/10
 
 
 
 
Stalin:  
From Terrorism to State Terror, 1905-1939 
 
by 
Matthew Walz 
 
A Thesis 
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of 
St. Cloud State University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of 
Master of Arts 
in History 
 
 
May, 2017 
 
 
Thesis Committee: 
Marie Seong-Hak Kim, Chairperson 
Mary Wingerd 
Edward Greaves 
Plamen Miltenoff  
2 
 
Abstract 
 While scholars continue to debate the manner in which the Great Terror took shape in the 
Soviet Union, Stalin’s education as a revolutionary terrorist leader from 1905-1908 is often 
overlooked as a causal feature. This thesis analyzes the parallels between the revolutionary 
terrorists in Russia in the first decade of the twentieth century, particularly within Stalin’s Red 
Brigade units, and the henchmen carrying out the Great Terror of the 1930s. Both shared 
characteristics of loyalty, ruthlessness and adventurism while for the most part lacking any 
formal education and existing in a world of paranoia. As violence spread after the 1905 
Revolution, the justifications for indiscriminate murder expanded across a variety of 
revolutionary parties in the face of state repression. In a striking resemblance to the 1930s, 
revolutionary terrorists employed ideology to legitimize atrocious acts which were criminal in 
nature and often intended only for personal gain or empowerment. In the revolutionary 
atmosphere of the first decade of the twentieth century, Stalin learned how to manipulate 
ideology to commit unseemly acts of violence, and discovered the criminal types needed to carry 
them out. By viewing the Great Terror in this context, this thesis attempts to break down the 
categorizations between insurgency terrorism and state terror, and refute the interpretation of 
state terror as a character or regional-based tradition. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In order to perpetrate an atrocity, one must become accustomed to such behavior, unless, 
of course, there exists some psychological impediment. This is as true for the common criminal 
as it is for the terrorist. One does not simply go from the cradle to wielding the executioner’s 
sword without drastic, life-changing events and a cognitive transformation along the way. This 
was certainly the case for Josef Stalin, a leader of one of the most murderous regimes in modern 
history. While the dismal outcome of his leadership is not debatable, the reason and method 
behind the terror, which some historians have estimated caused the death of as many as twenty 
million people, is still up for discussion.1 Stalin’s revolutionary education as a Red Brigade 
fighter from 1905-1908 has so far received little attention as a contributing factor to forming the 
ideological and criminal makeup behind the Great Terror of the 1930s. When analyzing and 
comparing these historic situations, however, significant parallels are evident. Stalin learned 
lessons about the vast uses of political violence and its emotional appeal during his involvement 
in the terrorism which engulfed Russia in the first decade of the twentieth century. He used 
similar tactics to consolidate his hold over power and to move forward his version of socialism in 
the Soviet Union. To achieve his aims, he surrounded himself with pitiless criminals willing to 
do his bidding, and by using their ruthlessness he oversaw a massive transformation of society. 
                                                          
1 The figure of 20 million takes into consideration those who died once Stalin assumed power by 1928 and up until 
his death in 1953. It is taken from Robert Conquest, The Great Terror: A Reassessment, 40th anniversary Ed. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 488. The author concluded that this estimate could be off and is almost 
certainly too low. Revisionist scholars contest these numbers, believing that they are far too inflated. See Alec Nove, 
“Victims of Stalinism: How Many?” in Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives, ed. J. Arch Getty and Roberta T. 
Manning (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 260-274. The author argued that less than ten million 
deaths can be placed at the hands of the Stalin regime during his time in power. Needless to say, this number is still 
being contested by scholars. 
5 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, terrorism exploded in Russia across a variety 
of revolutionary parties. The members of these parties implemented violent tactics in order to 
overthrow the tsar. They organized terrorist units and gangs, often in separation from party 
leadership, and their only goal was to wreak havoc on government officials. Vladimir Lenin in 
1905 called for followers of the Bolsheviks to “kill spies, policemen, gendarmes, Cossacks, and 
members of the Black Hundreds; to blow up their headquarters, along with police stations; and to 
throw boiling water on soldiers or fling acid at the police.”2 On his bidding, Red Battle Squads 
were formed. In Georgia, Stalin took charge of these units.3 He assumed the role of a mob boss, 
conducting expropriations across the country, organizing rackets, extorting from wealthy 
entrepreneurs, and even ordering assassinations. After a successful heist, the spoils went directly 
to Lenin and the Bolshevik Party. Stalin’s units were effective; they successfully “disarmed 
Russian troops, ambushed hated Cossacks, raided banks and murdered spooks and policemen.”4 
As stated by the prodigious writer Simon Sebag Montefiore: “Stalin preferred rogues to 
revolutionaries. He was ‘always seen in the company of cutthroats, blackmailers, robbers and the 
gunslingers—the Mauserists…’ In power, he shocked his comrades by promoting criminals in 
the NKVD, but he had used criminals all his life.”5  
Revolutionary parties attracted seedy characters at the turn of the century. These 
organizations provided an outlet for violence and illegal behavior as long as it was committed in 
the name of the revolution. Thus, the radicals appropriated ideology to commit and legitimize 
                                                          
2 This quote is taken from Anna Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill: Revolutionary Terrorism in Russia, 1894-1917 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), 91. 
3 For more information on the conduct of Stalin and his direct involvement in these units, see Simon Sebag 
Montefiore, Young Stalin (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), 192-200. 
4 Montefiore, Young Stalin, 132. 
5 Ibid., 204. Italics added for emphasis. 
6 
acts normally considered criminal, when in fact they had nothing to do with the revolution but 
were driven by personal gain, profit or pure vengeance. A majority of these new revolutionaries 
did not possess simple rudimentary knowledge of their party’s stand. They justified their exploits 
with “half-literate and clumsy street language,”6 and many only undertook a study of theory 
while in prison after being arrested, where they had ample time and little else to do.7 The public 
deliberated over the involvement of “an increasing number of the “freedom fighters” in “banditry 
and robberies in most cases not for any political motives, but exclusively for the satisfaction of 
their base instincts.””8 Certain so-called revolutionaries retired to other countries after accruing 
significant wealth on their exploits, while others spent their riches to lead a life consumed with 
adventure, alcohol and debauchery.9  
The violence soon engulfed the country in chaos. Between the years 1905 and 1907, 
terrorists had killed or injured 4,500 state officials, along with 4,710 private individuals. 
Between January 1908 and May 1910, officials recorded 19,957 terrorist attacks, including 
robberies, resulting in the death of 732 state bureaucrats and 3,051 private individuals. Over the 
five-year period of 1905-1910, it is estimated that 17,000 people died or were injured at the 
hands of revolutionary terrorists in Russia.10 As conspicuous as these significant numbers, was 
the increase in the death ratio of private citizens compared with state officials toward the year 
1910. This in part can be attributed to the dehumanization of individuals and enemies amidst the 
fervor of revolution, justified and called for under the spell of the radical parties’ ideologies.  
                                                          
6 Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 60. 
7 Ibid., 69. 
8 Ibid., 162. 
9 See ibid., 163. 
10 These statistics are taken from ibid., 21. 
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Fed up with the lack of progress in effecting change, certain organizations during this 
time began reverting to more extreme measures to spawn the revolution. This included 
conforming to the ideology of radical theorists. These thinkers constructed a worldview of 
society split into two groups: friend and enemy.11 The enemies needed to be liquidated in order 
to purify society for the future coming of socialism or anarchism.12 Numerous parties shared the 
language of purification, including the Mensheviks, even though they denounced terrorism as a 
tactic. A leader of this group, Georgi Plekhanov, declared: “We will not shoot at the tsar and his 
servants now as the Socialist-Revolutionaries do, but after the victory we will erect a guillotine 
in Kazanskii Square for them and many others.”13 The symbolism of the guillotine, as was used 
in the French Revolution, was clear: the transformation and moral purification of society would 
only come through violence. Two decades later, Stalin forced the Soviet Union on the path to 
socialism by eliminating “enemies of the people” in the Great Terror of the 1930s. Applying 
ideology, Soviet leaders dehumanized certain quarters of the population in order to legitimize 
mass terror. On December 12, 1937, Stalin and Premier Molotov individually signed off on 
3,167 death sentences.14 After a day full of sanctioning these murders, they spent the evening 
together in the cinema, as if their work was just another day in the office. 
Stalin’s reign of terror has frequently been analyzed as a symptom of his psychological 
makeup stemming from issues he experienced in youth. Some have seen it as a mere 
continuation of the leadership of earlier tsars and their attempt to move Russia into new frontiers 
                                                          
11 One such theorist is Ivan Pavlov, whose pamphlet The Purification of Mankind called for elimination of the 
“ethical race” which consisted of the titans of government and industry. According to Pavlov, traits of greed and 
avarice were inherited, so even children could be perceived as threats. For more information, see ibid., 81-83. 
12 See Susan Morrissey, “The “Apparel of Innocence”: Toward a Moral Economy of Terrorism in Late Imperial 
Russia,” The Journal of Modern History 84 (2012), 630-636. 
13 This quote is taken from Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 97. 
14 This is recounted in Conquest, The Great Terror, 235. 
8 
of social development. In contemporary biographies, his rule has regularly been likened to Peter 
the Great, and even more frequently Ivan the Terrible, who the Soviet leader himself had an 
affinity for.15 Most recently, significant research has been conducted analyzing and comparing 
the regimes of Stalin and Adolf Hitler in the context of totalitarian administrations.16 
Undoubtedly, such a comparison is a result of the notoriety of these personalities, but it is also 
due to their similarly as dictators instituting measures of state terror. While this kind of approach 
has brought new insight on totalitarianism, it has viewed state terror as more or less a character-
based tradition and therefore tends to muddle how regimes supporting terror often develop in 
highly ideological environments encouraging violence. Stalin’s troubling ten years spent at the 
strict Gori Theological School, as well as his childhood family life consisting of an abusive 
father and a mother who worshipped him, have all been thoroughly analyzed to illuminate their 
impact on the formation of Stalin’s revolutionary character.17 Little attention has been paid, 
however, to the part he played as a leader of Bolshevik terrorist units beginning in 1905, and 
                                                          
15 For a brief comparison see Martin Malia, “The Soviet Tragedy: A History of Socialism in Russia,” in Stalinism: 
The Essential Readings, ed. David L. Hoffman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 68-79. Helen Rappaport in 
Stalin: A Biographical Companion (Santa Barbara, CA: ABV-CLIO, 1999) stated that “Stalin’s worst excesses have 
often been compared to those of the infamous Russian ruler, Ivan IV,” and then proceeds to draw those comparisons. 
See pgs. 133-134. Stalin himself revered Ivan the Terrible, going so far as to call him his “alter ego.” See Simon 
Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York: Vintage Books, 2003), 177. For scholarship on 
how Stalin, Ivan the Terrible, and Peter the Great were perceived in Russia during the Soviet period, see Maureen 
Pierre, The Cult of Ivan the Terrible in Stalin’s Russia (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002); and Kevin M. 
F. Platt, Terror and Greatness: Ivan and Peter as Russian Myths (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 176-207. 
16 For contemporary examples see Michael Geyer and Shelia Fitzpatrick, Beyond Totalitarianism: Stalinism and 
Nazism Compared (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Timothy Snyder, Bloodlands: Europe 
Between Hitler and Stalin (New York: Basic Books, 2010). 
17 For a prominent example of this, see Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 64-114. The author focused the most 
attention on Stalin’s time at the Gori Theological School. A lot of young men came out of these seminaries as new 
revolutionaries in reaction to the strict discipline imposed on the students. At the same time, the author indicated that 
the abuse Stalin received at the hands of his father aided in the development of a “vindictiveness and mean streak 
reminiscent of the father whom he despised.” See pg. 75. Also, he argued that Stalin’s mother worshipped and 
praised the boy, creating in him the “feeling of a conqueror.” See pg. 76. Additionally, see Robert Service, Stalin: A 
Biography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 13-21. The author indicated here that from his 
earliest days, Stalin looked to dominate people, a personality trait which carried over to his later years. 
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subsequently the impact of this in shaping him for the eventual role as the ruthless despot.18 
Drawing from his extensive work in the Georgian archives, a recent biographer, Simon Sebag 
Montefiore, described in detail Stalin’s involvement in these terrorist units. In the words of the 
author: “For the first time, we can document his [Stalin] role in the bank robberies, protection-
rackets, extortion, arson, piracy, murder—the political gangsterism—that impressed Lenin and 
trained Stalin in the very skills that would prove invaluable in the political jungle of the Soviet 
Union.”19 While Montefiore has offered much evidence of these events in his account, he has 
attempted little analysis on the ways they shaped Stalin’s political and ideological outlook in his 
later life. This thesis aims to shed light on the transition from Stalin “the bandit” to Stalin “the 
tyrant” by focusing on his terrorist activities as a youth.  
Significant work has been produced on the topic of terrorism in nineteenth and twentieth-
century Russia, especially since the opening of Soviet archives in 1990. Norman Naimark has 
conducted outstanding work charting the evolution of the revolutionary organization the People’s 
Will, which assassinated Tsar Alexander II in 1881.20 The activities of these radicals ushered in a 
new wave of revolutionary thinkers. These ideologists placed terrorism at the forefront of the 
path to revolution. The work of Anna Geifman has critically shown the connection between the 
developments at the end of the nineteenth to the twentieth century. She has conducted extensive 
research on the tumultuous years of 1905-1910. During this period, terrorism was rampant across 
                                                          
18 Robert Tucker in Stalin as Revolutionary only referenced Stalin’s role in the expropriations between 1905 and 
1908 in brief passages on pgs. 102 and 146; Stephen Kotkin in his expansive biography Stalin Volume I: Paradoxes 
of Power, 1878-1928 (New York: Penguin Press, 2014), dedicated two chapters to Stalin’s youth and development 
(pgs. 11-55), and only a few pages on his revolutionary banditry (pgs. 112-116). 
19 Montefiore, Young Stalin, xxii. 
20 See Norman Naimark, Terrorists and Social Democrats: The Russian Revolutionary Movement under Alexander 
III (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983). 
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a variety of political organizations in Russia.21 Her scholarship is particularly valuable, given the 
fact Stalin partook in terrorist activities in the Caucuses during 1905-1908. Even though Geifman 
discussed him only in passing references, her work has successfully mapped the environment in 
which Stalin operated. While she has yet to tackle the impact of this time period on Stalin’s 
ideological outlook in the 1930s, she does hint at its likelihood.22 
A significant amount of scholarship regarding the Soviet Union and Stalin has focused on 
the events leading to, as well as the consequences of, the Great Terror. Robert Conquest’s work 
has been substantial to this discourse. His research placed Stalin as the main actor in the arena, 
the architect and overseer of the murder of millions of people, including some of those closest to 
him.23 In Conquest’s work, Stalin appears as a ruthless and vicious leader committing atrocities 
without second thought on his quest for absolute power. While this outlook on the character of 
Stalin has been widely accepted in academia, certain revisionist scholars, such as J. Arch Getty, 
have questioned Conquest’s argument about the implementation and nature of the terror.24 The 
academics supporting the revisionist model contend the totalitarian paradigm ignores the 
autonomy of individual actors, both perpetrators of crimes and the victims. Consequently, Getty 
has shown local officials across the regions of the vast empire disobeyed the imposed limits by 
                                                          
21 See Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill; and Death Orders: The Vanguard of Modern Terrorism in Revolutionary Russia 
(Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, 2010). 
22 In Death Orders the author covered how the Bolsheviks used terror after coming to power in the Revolution, but 
she stops shy of the 1930s. See pgs. 122-138. In Thou Shalt Kill, she stated: “It is worth speculating whether it is 
simply a historical coincidence that in the twentieth century, which has been dominated by totalitarian ideology and 
persecutions…the initial traits of totalitarianism were in evidence among revolutionary extremists in Russia.” See 
pgs. 82-83. 
23 See Conquest, The Great Terror. The name “The Great Terror,” which refers to the period of 1937-1939 when the 
purges were at their peak, is attributed to this monumental work. 
24 See J. Arch Getty and Robert Manning, ed., Stalinist Terror: New Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1993). 
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the Kremlin on deportations and arrests, and Stalin stepped in to stop these excesses.25 Moreover, 
while there is no disputing Stalin’s central role in the terror, more research is needed on the 
interactions and outlook of society at large. With that said, the current scholarship on the period 
of the 1930s is extensive and continues to grow.  
This thesis argues there is a critical connection between the revolutionary terrorism in 
1905-1910, including among Stalin’s Red Brigade units, and the state terror of the 1930s. 
Through an analysis of secondary sources, complemented by primary documents including 
personal memoirs and the collective works of Josef Stalin, I attempt to map the nexus between 
the two, particularly within the use and manipulation of ideology. 26 My argument is Stalin 
carried the important lessons he learned about ideologically motivated violence during his time 
as a revolutionary fighter with him throughout his political career. His “learning” included how 
to justify murder and other criminal activities by enlisting ideology, no matter how remote. This 
is not to say Stalin did not believe in Marxism and Leninism; on the contrary, he was a devout 
follower of these ideologies. But he also understood the power and the basic emotional appeal of 
these ideas. When properly implemented, they could legitimate the commitment of unseemly 
acts of violence. At the same time, he also recognized the importance of finding the right, like-
minded people to carry out his atrocities. These individuals would never qualify as intellectuals, 
by any stretch of the word, and instead were as ruthless as they were loyal to the tyrant. 
                                                          
25 See J. Arch Getty, ““Excesses Are Not Permitted” Mass Terror and Stalinist Governance in the Late 1930s,” The 
Russian Review 61 (2002), 113-138. 
26 Stalin’s Collected Works are hosted online, translated into English, in the Marxists Internet Archive. Because of 
Stalin’s affinity for tampering with documents to promote his best image, as well as only publicly releasing the 
works of his own choosing, the validity of these writings and speeches has to be questioned. Nonetheless, this does 
not mean they have no important historical use. 
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In this thesis, I attempt to chart the development of ideological terrorism in Russia up to 
the mid-twentieth century. Chapter I discusses the historical background. Russian history is 
mired with peasant revolts in the countryside and palace coups since the sixteenth century. But 
these events, given their reactionary nature and limited goals, cannot be considered revolutionary 
in outlook. Nor can the Decembrist revolt in the early nineteenth century, though it was a 
precursor to the People’s Will and the onset of the use of terrorism as a revolutionary tool to 
overthrow the Tsar. In Chapter II, I provide a window into the first decade of the twentieth 
century, and show the ways a variety of revolutionary parties in Russia resorted to political 
violence to effect change. Individuals in these organizations used the fervor of the revolution to 
commit criminal activities for personal gain or vengeance. As the violence progressed, certain 
extremists applied ideology to dehumanize the population in order to commit indiscriminate 
terror. In Chapter III, I discuss Stalin’s role as the leader of Red Brigade units in 1905-1908, and 
describe the criminals he closely associated with. In Chapter IV, I attempt to contextualize the 
manipulation of ideology in the first decade of the twentieth century in terms of how it was used 
during the Great Terror. Stalin employed ideology as a never-ending transformative tool to 
consolidate his power and protect the revolution by constructing and attacking an array of 
perceived enemies. Both prior to the Russian Revolution and in the 1930s, radicals constructed a 
dichotomous outlook of society to debase victims and justify mass murder. In the final chapter, 
Chapter V, I compare the characteristics of Stalin’s gangs in the first decade of the twentieth 
century with his henchmen who carried out the terror in the 1930s. Both groups consisted of 
mostly uneducated individuals sharing qualities of ruthlessness, loyalty, and adventurism. 
Likewise, they both used the fervor of the revolution for their own personal gain. 
13 
Stalin’s involvement in the rampant terrorism during 1905-1910 should be considered 
fundamental to his revolutionary education. His willingness to apply violence to the extent he did 
in the 1930s to consolidate power and push forth his vision of socialism can be seen as a logical 
evolution from this early period in his life. To be sure, other factors, such as his youth spent at 
the theological seminary, had an important impact on Stalin’s development. There are, however, 
compelling parallels which should not be ignored between his experiences during his formative 
years in the first decade of the twentieth century and his use of ideology to commit the Great 
Terror. While categorizing the events of the 1930s as state terror, one may be tempted to draw 
the conclusion of Stalin as a continuation of earlier tsars such as Ivan the Terrible. This 
interpretation, however, risks making authoritarian rule a Russian tradition and obfuscates the 
development of state terror under Stalin as a unique historical situation. It is important not to let 
categorizations prevent us from perceiving the forces of continuity outside of these confined 
classifications. By viewing the state terror under Stalin as taking shape during a revolutionary 
insurgency thirty years prior, we can open a new window through which we confront historical 
events, and analyze why so many innocent people were murdered at the hands of one tyrant. 
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CHAPTER I: THE EVOLUTION OF REVOLT 
Scholars have often considered Russia to be the birthplace of modern terrorism.1 This 
position is due to the recurrence of politically motivated assassinations beginning in the 1870s 
and reaching their peak in 1905-1910 when revolutionary terrorists killed and wounded an 
estimated 17,000 individuals.2 On the other hand, the tyrannicide in the Greek and Roman 
empires prior to the Common Era, and the discussions of its use across Western Europe during 
the Renaissance and Reformation periods, never threatened Russian tsars.3 Their ability to avoid 
upheaval and assassination is in part attributed to the lack of literature and scholarship available 
to Russians debating the justifications for killing a tyrant.4 This is not to say political violence 
never occurred. Peasant revolts were prevalent in the countryside and palace coups often took 
place following the death of a tsar. Violent and political in nature, these events cannot be called 
revolutionary because their intentions were reactionary and did not include fundamental change. 
Even the Decembrist revolt, which looked to reform the current system by bringing the voice of 
the people (at least the nobility) to the government, cannot be considered revolutionary in 
outlook. Political violence for the sake of revolution did not take place in Russia until the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, when radicals thought killing the tsar would engender systemic 
                                                          
1 It is considered the birthplace of modern terrorism because of the prolific use of violence to promote systemic 
political and societal change. Prior uses of terrorism, typically in the form of tyrannicde, were mostly not intended to 
fundamentally change these functions of government, and thus differ categorically. While terrorism of this nature 
occurred across the globe in the nineteenth century, Anna Geifman in Death Orders contended that the 
concentration in Russia in the 1870s was greater than anywhere else. See pgs. 12-13. A.I. Suvorov in 
“Политический Терроризм в России XIX - Начала XX Веков: Истоки, Структура, Ообенност,” Историческая 
социология (2002), argued that Russian terrorism was different from other countries because of its high level of 
organization and participation. See pgs. 57-58.  
2 For these statistics, see Geifman, Death Orders, 15. 
3 The earliest philosophies justifying the use of tyrranicide can be traced to Xenonphon (430-354 BC) and Marcus 
Tullius Cicero (106-43 BC).  
4 See Martin A. Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism: State, Society, and the Dynamics of Political 
Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 59. 
15 
change to the political and social order. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish between these 
types of political violence and their true ideological motivations. 
 
Peasant Revolts and the Russian Enlightenment 
In the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the Russian countryside experienced a 
series of peasant revolts. The major uprisings include the Bolotnikov movement of 1606-1607, 
the Stenka Razin revolt in 1670-1671, the Bulavin rising of 1707-1708, and the most famous and 
well documented Pugachev revolt of 1773-1775. Generally, these revolts were reactions to the 
situation the peasants experienced at the hands of the gentry. By all accounts, peasants lived a 
harsh and difficult life given the social and economic situation and their dependence upon the 
landowning classes. The gentry treated serfs “like cattle” and the “grip of lord over serf was 
absolute.”5 The result of each of these revolts was devastating: the peasants burned farms, 
destroyed houses, and murdered landowners. During the insurrection bearing his name, 
Pugachev laid out his aims in the late eighteenth century; these included replacing Catherine the 
Great with a new emperor as well as a general redistribution of land from the gentry to the 
peasantry. While he fought for the betterment of his lot, Pugachev had no intention to 
systematically replace the current socio-political system. His distaste for Catherine and demand 
for her removal did not include a limitation on the sovereign’s powers.6 
Beginning in the late eighteenth century, during the time of Pugachev and the rule of 
Catherine the Great, a Russian Enlightenment transpired among members of the nobility. The 
                                                          
5 Philip Longworth, “The Pugachev Revolt: The Last Great Cossack-Peasant Rising,” in Rural Protest: Peasant 
Movements and Social Change, ed. Henry A. Landsberger (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1973), 207. 
6 See Longworth, “The Pugachev Revolt,” 220-230. 
16 
Empress, enamored by the French philosophes, regularly corresponded with prolific writers and 
thinkers such as Voltaire, Denis Diderot, and Baron von Grimm.7 At the time, it appeared as if 
“Catherine tried to give the impression that she was essentially a republican and was aiming at 
the gradual abolition of despotism.”8 During her rule, books on philosophy and liberal thought 
spread across literary circles. Inspired by Parisian literary salons, and as an avid reader and 
writer herself, she intended to make literature a social activity. Catherine established the Society 
for the Translation of Foreign Books in November 1768, allowing more Russians to read and 
discuss questions of morality and liberalism. 9  The opening of society to Western ideas spawned 
a generation of Russian Enlightenment thinkers; included in this group was Alexander 
Radishchev. 
Radishchev, considered the “Enlightenment thinker par excellence” and “the most radical 
and consistent representative of the Age of Reason in Russia,” took a strong stance on the 
condition of the peasantry.10 On the dawn of the Pugachev revolt, Radishchev wrote his Journey 
from St. Petersburg to Moscow which caused a stir across the country. In it the author issued “a 
generalized cry of indignation” against the government and warned of a peasant uprising that 
would overthrow the current system and order.11 To prevent this revolution, the results of which 
he thought would be disastrous for Russia, Radishchev concluded reforms were necessary, 
including the abolition of serfdom. 12 After reading the book, Catherine had a different reaction, 
                                                          
7 Andrzej Walicki, A History of Russian Thought: From the Enlightenment to Marxism (California: Stanford 
University Press, 1979), 3. 
8 Walicki, A History of Russian Thought, 3. 
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calling Radishchev “a rebel worse than Pugachev.”13 Nearing the end of her reign, Catherine 
took notice of the French Revolution and feared the atmosphere of egalitarianism and revolt 
might spill over to Russia. The public discussions and Enlightenment thinking at first encouraged 
during her reign, she now censored and more or less outlawed. A crackdown on dissenters 
ensued, and Catherine ordered the arrest of Radishchev who was subsequently condemned to 
death by beheading.14 The tide could not be contained, however, as his ideas, as well as those of 
other Enlightenment thinkers, continued into the nineteenth century, and made their mark on the 
Decembrists.  
 
The Decembrists and Palace Coups 
 For the first time in Russian history, the Decembrists intended to influence the 
government in order to benefit the population as a whole and not just members of one group or 
class. To do so, they challenged Nicholas I’s ascension to the throne in what could more or less 
be called a coup. This was not the first time, however, these methods were used. Throughout the 
eighteenth century, the Guards attempted multiple palace coups due to the absence of any sort of 
law of succession. Consequently, after the death of a ruler, aristocratic families aligned with 
military leaders to fight and murder disputed tsars in order to seize the throne. These leaders 
acted strictly out of self-interest: to put their favorite candidates in power to gain the advantages 
and rewards that come with the rule of government.15 While seeking their own betterment 
through reforms, the Decembrists also sought to improve the situation of their fellow 
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countrymen. At the same time, they held no intentions to overthrow the firmly established 
system of governance. Instead, they acted to effect change within the structure, meaning the 
Decembrists cannot be ascribed the status of revolutionaries.16  
Preceding the revolt, the Decembrists, consisting primarily of members of the nobility 
and military leaders, continued to hold loyalty to the monarchy. Alexander I took the throne in 
1801 in the midst of optimism, particularly among the educated elite. His coming to power 
elicited a general expectation of reform which included limiting the absolutism of the autocracy 
and replacing it with the implementation of the rule of law.17 The young men in the Decembrist 
movement discussed Enlightenment thinking in secret societies and understood Western political 
philosophy. They saw the rule of law as a bulwark against arbitrary brutality by the state, and 
paramount to their cause was a concern for the security of the individual. “It was the first time 
that an influential group in Russian society held a conception of the Russian state as distinct and 
separate from the ruler.”18 They wanted to open government to include participation from the 
elite and implement reforms to aid the impoverished peasantry. Many of the Decembrists partook 
in the Napoleonic Wars as officers in the Russian Army, during which time the government 
made statements indicating fundamental reform would follow the conclusion of the fighting.19 
When these reforms did not come to realization, educated elites joined secret societies discussing 
ways to best propel the state forward modeled on the rule of law. While they would have liked 
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the monarchy to voluntarily set limits on his sovereign power, they gradually understood this 
would not freely come about. 
 Poorly planned and organized, the revolt started on December 14, 1825 as a conflict over 
the succession of Tsar Alexander I. On this day, Nicholas prepared to take the oath of allegiance. 
The Royal Guards, however, had already taken an oath of allegiance to his brother Constantine 
on November 27. Earlier, Constantine had removed himself from the line of succession, opening 
the path to the throne for Nicholas. In opposition to the accession of Nicholas to the throne, 
3,000 men led by officers and members of the Decembrists lined the Senate Square in 
preparation for combat. Nicholas, already wary about the loyalty of the troops and the Guards, 
planned for a potential uprising. He used loyalist troops to easily squash the rebellion.20 In the 
end, the state sentenced five leaders of the Decembrists to be hanged and 121 others to “hard 
labor, disciplinary battalions, and exile.” 300 others were transferred to remote regions and kept 
under special supervision.21 
  
Formation of a Revolutionary Class 
On the surface, it looked as if the autocracy had defeated the Decembrist movement 
quickly and painlessly. This, however, was not the conclusion of the affair. Educated society 
popularly decried the punishments handed out to the Decembrists. They believed these young 
men, though acting foolishly and recklessly, did so in the service of their country.22 At the same 
time, the Decembrists awakened an ongoing conflict between the nobility and the autocracy. 
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Members of the elite increasingly felt alienated from the government. After Peter the Great’s 
reforms, the tsar no longer relied on their service to the nation, causing a void and lack of 
purpose in high-status society. Moreover, as Western ideas infiltrated their ranks, the elite began 
to see themselves not as servants of the government, but instead of the people.23  
Even though the Decembrists respected and revered the monarchy and had no intention to 
develop a rift between the tsar and the people, intellectuals such as Alexander Herzen adopted 
the movement to indicate the defining moment of division between state and society.24 The 
failure, arrests, and execution of members of the Decembrists strongly stirred a young Herzen 
and other liberals. He stated in his memoir: “The accounts of the rising and of the trial of the 
leaders, and horror in Moscow, made a deep impression on me; a new world was revealed to me 
which became more and more the center of my moral existence…The execution of Pestel and his 
associates finally dissipated the childish dreams of my soul.”25 
Straying from the path of the Decembrists, intellectuals like Herzen emerged as true 
revolutionaries, at least in theory, since they promoted the implementation of a new system of 
society and governance—socialism. Accordingly, numerous scholars have concluded “the 
development of a fully democratic and apocalyptic ideal of revolution only came after the 
Decembrists.”26 In this sense, socialism, anarchism, and Marxism, which all came to fruition 
during this time, were simultaneously entwined with revolution. Similar to the Decembrists, 
theoreticians behind the development of these ideologies were members of the gentry, who, 
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being “from the possessing classes,” were “no longer of them,”27 through their Western 
education and isolation from the monarchy. By 1848, the Year of Revolution, these ideologies 
were firmly established across the globe, and “turned from general theory to considerations of 
practical politics and strategy.”28 In 1852, while exiled in London, Herzen established the Free 
Russian Press. He produced and funded a large collection of Russian works attacking the current 
system of government. Smuggled into the country, these journals, including the Polar Star and 
The Bell, held extraordinary influence. Resulting from his work, and the effort of other 
intellectuals, a revolutionary class started to form, and Herzen donned the role as the “father of 
Russian socialism.”29 Nikolay Cherneyshevsky published similar ideological books and journals 
including The Contemporary in Russia as a complement to Herzen writing abroad. 
In 1863, Chernyshevsky wrote one of his most influential books entitled What is to be 
Done?. An important piece of literature for radicals during this time, it expressed how a 
revolutionary should possess an extreme devotion to the cause. In What is to be Done? the main 
characters share this outlook and dedicate their lives to the struggle. One of the characters, 
Rakhmetov, devotes himself so much to the cause he sleeps on a bed of nails as a matter of self-
abnegation and discipline.30 Eventually, the police arrested Chernyshevsky for his writings (he 
wrote What is to be Done? in the Peter and Paul Fortress) and exiled him to Siberia. The state, 
however, could not silence what he had already written. Enamored with the novel and the 
depiction of such a caring and devoted revolutionary, a young Lenin constructed a work of his 
own with the same title.  
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An important aspect in the evolution of the revolutionary fighter is embodied in the life 
of Sergey Nechaev. The disturbing fanaticism and outlook aside,31 his Catechism of a 
Revolutionary written in 1869 became a vital document for defining what it means to be a 
revolutionary. Nechaev wrote the radical is a “doomed man” who must dedicate himself solely to 
the cause. “He knows only one science: the science of destruction.”32 The revolutionary “must 
ally himself with the savage world of the violent criminal, the only true revolutionary in Russia.” 
According to Nechaev, the radical’s only task was to overthrow the current order by any means 
necessary, including the use of terrorism and torture, without concern for the reconstruction of a 
future society.33 This work, particularly in the form of political assassination, would bring about 
a massive uprising of the peasantry. Nechaev classified how targets of assassination should be 
chosen based on how their deaths would “inspire the greatest fear in the government.” In the end, 
amidst all the destruction and chaos, the ultimate goal was “the complete liberation and 
happiness of the masses.”34 
Even before Nechaev, by mid-century revolutionaries around the world vehemently 
called for political violence as a remedy to despotism. While Herzen and Chernyshevsky never 
promoted the use of violence and instead believed socialism would come about through the 
education of the masses, others considered terror paramount in order to effect real change. An 
example of such a revolutionary is Karl Heinzen. In 1853, he published Murder and Liberty in 
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France. Heinzen called on anyone facing government repression throughout the world to respond 
with equal viciousness and ferocity. According to the author, the state cloaked their consistent 
repression and murder of citizens from the public by labelling these activities “war.” The only 
logical response to such violence was to equally match its devastation. And because ordinary 
citizens did not possess the weapons of the state, they must rely on individual acts of terror. In 
fact, he argued it was the responsibility of revolutionaries to kill despotic leaders because by 
doing so they would be saving countless future lives.35 While Heinzen may not have been 
popularly read in Russia, young radicals in St. Petersburg distributed Peter Zaichnevsky’s 
“Young Russia” written in 1862, and another pamphlet called “To the Young Generation.”36 
Both advocated a violent overthrow of the system which would “shed twice as much blood as did 
the Jacobins during the 1790s.”37 
 
Political Assassinations and the Populists 
In the midst of revolutionary calls, some more violent than others, on April 4, 1866 
Dmitry Karakozov attempted to assassinate the Tsar, the first effort as such by a revolutionary. 
He believed the Tsar’s assassination would stir a rebellion against the regime.38 Even though his 
shot missed the target, and his arrest shortly followed, his voice resounded: “My death will be an 
example for them and inspire them.”39 And indeed, to some degree, it did. The assassination 
                                                          
35 See Daniel Bessner and Michael Stauch, “Karl Heinzen and the Intellectual Origins of Modern Terror,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 22 (2010): 143-176. 
36 See Oleg V. Budnitskii, ““Кровь по Совести”: Терроризм в России (Вторая Половина XIX – начало XX в.),” 
Сообщения (1994): 203. 
37 Miller, The Foundations of Modern Terrorism, 66. 
38 For a detailed account of his assassination attempt and the life of Dmitry Karakozov, see Claudia Verhoeven, The 
Odd Man Karakozov: Imperial Russia, Modernity and the Birth of Terrorism (New York: Cornell University Press, 
2009). 
39 Verhoeven, The Odd Man Karakozov, 130. 
24 
attempt influenced Nechaev, and fifteen years later the People’s Will finished what Karakozov 
could not—the successful murder of the Tsar. 40  The assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 
by members of the People’s Will occurred as a result of ideology and action coming together. 
Similar to Karakozov, members of this terrorist outfit believed his death would spark the 
revolution and institute the move towards socialism. Of course, the assassination did not result in 
such idealized goals, though it did succeed in drawing revolutionaries together for a greater push 
in the twentieth century.  
It is important to note while the practice of terrorism gained traction before the 
assassination in 1881, only a small proportion of revolutionaries believed in its use. In the 1860s, 
the People’s Will consisted of approximately 100 active members, and by 1879 still fewer than 
500, a comparatively small amount of the total revolutionaries.41 After the assassination, 
membership vastly expanded and the government responded with a crackdown on the 
organization. Most revolutionaries before 1881, however, continued to hold a strong belief 
socialism could develop through peaceful and populist measures. 
In the “mad summer” of 1874, the populists took the message of socialism directly to the 
Russian peasantry. They believed they could teach the peasants the village commune was an 
ideal form of living where government oppression would disappear along with the “sickness of 
capitalism.”42 This enlightenment of the peasantry would then engender the creation of a 
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federation of communes throughout Europe, and only then would the people be truly free. As 
such, the populists cared little for political revolution, or the seizure of power, and so they 
deemed violent measures against the government unnecessary. Regardless of their outlook on 
violence, police and local authorities hounded populists across the countryside. The state arrested 
700 individuals in the summer of 1874, and of this group held 267 for trial. Of those 267, only 
193 would stand trial three years later; the rest either died, went insane from the conditions in 
prison, or had already been exiled by the state.43 At the same time, the peasantry often rejected 
the populists and their message, causing some to rethink their outlook on how best to achieve the 
social revolution. Formed in 1876, The Land and Liberty Party, which looked out for the 
interests of the populists, began discussing how best to achieve change, and the idea of political 
violence started to arise more frequently.44 
Along with the constant harassment of the police, the populists turned to methods of 
political violence in response to the “Zasulich affair.” In January 1878, the day after the state 
issued convictions of the individuals involved in the mad summer, Vera Zasulich shot and 
wounded F.F. Trepov, the governor of St. Petersburg. In her attack she sought to bring to light 
the flogging of one of the prisoners whose only crime was he did not remove his hat in the 
governor’s presence. A liberal court later acquitted Zasulich for the assassination attempt, and 
radicals immediately heralded her as a model for the use of terrorism.45 After this event, “the 
motives of the terrorists became increasingly political,”46 and soon a split formed in the Land and 
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Liberty Party.47 Georgii Plekhanov, arguing terrorism should not be used since it was not 
effective in concert with the social revolution, formed the Black Repartition Party. He indicated 
“political revolutions can never and in no place assure the people of economic and political 
freedom.”48 Those promoting the use of terrorism believed in its capacity to alter political 
institutions, a necessary step, it was thought, in the transition to socialism. These individuals 
formed the People’s Will.  
 
The People’s Will 
The People’s Will understood the Russian masses needed help, and through their acts of 
terrorism they could bring about a revolution and hand over power to the people in the form of a 
constituent assembly.49 They wielded terror to dismantle the state by eliminating its highest 
figure, Tsar Alexander II. In a proclamation written in 1880, they claimed to have begun “the 
armed struggle, being forced to it by the government and its tyrannical and violent suppression” 
of the people.50 In his diary, Lev Tikhomirov, a former member of the Executive Committee of 
the People’s Will, wrote the Emperor was not particularly a bad man, but he represented a 
system of repression, and “something higher was visible” in the goal of the revolutionaries.51 
Members of the People’s Will fought in the name of the masses, and believed the majority of the 
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Russian population supported their activities.52 As it turned out, their faith in the Russian people 
was misplaced. 
The People’s Will succeeded in assassinating Tsar Alexander II on March 13, 1881. The 
supposed revolution, however, did not follow. Instead, the people mourned the passing of the 
Tsar, and the government responded “with an unambiguous determination to reaffirm autocracy 
as the only law of the land.”53 Under G.D. Sudeikin, the secret police apparatus grew and 
succeeded in infiltrating the People’s Will. Sudeikin was an expert at turning radicals into his 
own agents. The scholar Richard Pipes documented this process in the case of Sergei Degaev. 
His betrayal was responsible for information leading to the arrests and near dismantlement of the 
terrorist faction of the People’s Will.54 Degaev’s conscience eventually got the best of him, and 
he informed the Executive Committee of the People’s Will of his duplicity. Instead of being 
banished or executed, the Executive Committee turned Dagaev into a double agent and ordered 
him with the task of murdering Sudeikin. After completing the deadly endeavor, the Committee 
excommunicated Dagaev from the People’s Will, and he spent the rest of his days in the United 
States working as a mathematician at South Dakota State University until his death in 1897. 
The crackdown on revolutionary groups hit the People’s Will particularly hard. Between 
1881 and 1894, the judiciary convicted 5,581 members of political crimes. The state executed 27 
of the worst of this group and imprisoned or sent to hard labor 342 others.55 Nonetheless, while 
the police repeatedly arrested their leaders, the boldness and success of the Tsar’s assassination 
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kept membership steady at this time. Simultaneously, the authority of the Executive Committee, 
in shambles after March 1881, diminished and their responsibility dispersed among a variety of 
sections and groups leaving no central leadership. The People’s Will continued their terrorist 
tactics and assassinations as isolated cells, keeping the fear alive for the life of the new tsar, 
Alexander III. The arrests and lack of access to resources, however, eventually brought the 
terrorism more or less to a halt, particularly after Dagaev’s betrayal had taken its toll. By 1883, 
in the words of Lev Tikhomirov: “The entire revolutionary organization was wholly in the hands 
of the police.”56 Dagaev’s involvement led to the arrests of more than 200 revolutionaries in the 
winter of 1883 alone.57 
 In 1884 and 1885, The People’s Will launched occasional terrorist attacks, but by 1886 a 
new calm had for the most part settled in the country. This ended abruptly in March 1887 after 
the police foiled another plot intending to assassinate the Tsar. They arrested the conspirators in 
Nevsky Prospect, three of which carried concealed bombs while waiting for the Tsar to 
approach. As Norman Naimark indicated: “Despite its failure, this conspiracy has become 
renowned as the most important event in the history of Russian radicalism during the reign of 
Alexander III.”58 The reason for this can in part be ascribed to the participation and leadership of 
Aleksandr Ilyich Ulyanov—Vladimir Lenin’s older brother. Also, the terrorists carried out this 
act without the permission and oversight of the Executive Committee of the People’s Will. As a 
group, the Terrorist Faction consisted of a combination of revolutionaries adhering to differing 
ideologies, such as populism, scientific socialism, and Marxism. The one thing which held the 
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group together was a staunch belief in the effectiveness of terrorism. Moreover, their attempt 
proved revolutionaries willing to use terrorism as part of the struggle against the tsar were not 
limited to one ideological outlook. They existed not only in the People’s Will, but also outside of 
this organization in groups such as the Social Democrats, even if not in the majority.59 
In the last decade of the nineteenth century, the People’s Will started to turn away from 
the use of terrorism. This came about in part from the influence of the Social Democrats aligning 
with the working class and rejecting the concept of a seizure of power, a central facet to the 
People’s Will. They pushed towards the construction of a constitution which they believed would 
ultimately lead to the implementation of socialism. By 1890, the secret police so often thwarted 
assassination attempts by the People’s Will they began to “turn away from the terrorist 
underground and to join a broader struggle for democratic rights in Russia.”60 After the famine in 
1891, revolutionaries again wielded terrorism for a brief period as a weapon for the people, but 
this fervor slowed to halt by the end of the century. The credence supporting the use of terrorism 
never disappeared, but as revolutionary parties started to form and unify at the end of the 
nineteenth century, the discussion of violence took a back seat to party ideology.61 
Violence of a political nature has been a part of Russian history. It did not, however, take 
revolutionary form until the latter half of the nineteenth century. By the end of the 1800s, 
revolutionary groups progressed towards the consensus of a democratic and parliamentary 
Russia to reflect the interests of the entire population. Since the state continued to crackdown on 
dissidents, the strength of the revolutionaries had to come from their numbers, and thus they 
began to rally and unify around this cause. Formed in 1893, the Party of People’s Rights 
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resembled a modern political party combining both liberals and radicals. Its short life and quick 
demise meant less than the circumstance that “a new phase of political activity began” at this 
time as antigovernment political parties increasingly formed.62 Although never abandoned, the 
use of terror took on a secondary role.63 And when this happened, the People’s Will ceased to 
exist; most members joined the Social Democrats or the Party of People’s Rights. Less than a 
decade later, however, with the formation of the Socialist-Revolutionary party in 1901, terrorism 
once again took prominence on the revolutionary stage. 
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CHAPTER II: REVOLUTIONARY TERRORISM IN RUSSIA, 1905-1910 
On January 22, 1905, unarmed workers and demonstrators, including women and 
children, marched to the Winter Palace in St. Petersburg to deliver a petition to the Tsar pleading 
for better working conditions. Nicholas II, not even in the capital at the time, stationed troops in 
advance of the demonstration. During the protest, events took a bloody turn when the soldiers 
opened fire on the mass of people. Moderate estimates claim the soldiers killed and wounded 200 
individuals.1 Father Gapon, leading the marchers, summarized their emotions when he 
exclaimed: “There is no longer any Tsar for us!”2 This event, which is now known as Bloody 
Sunday, sparked the 1905 Revolution, and kicked-off a wave of revolutionary terrorism which 
ended with the death of thousands of officials, terrorists, and innocent citizens.  
Between the years 1905-1910, ideologically driven violence consumed Russia in chaos. 
A variety of revolutionary organizations operated at this time, and party leaders continually 
sought after individuals to become foot soldiers in the revolution. To find those willing to 
sacrifice themselves as well as commit murder and other crimes, they “recruited from among the 
uncultured but zealous revolutionary youth.”3 This primarily included uneducated people of the 
lower or working-class strata of society. “Some peasant-turned-working-class terrorists had not 
even had elementary education and did not know how to read.”4 A portion of the radicals could 
be classified as mentally unstable, and for others their actions bordered on sadism. Fellow 
revolutionaries often described terrorists as “turbulent and unbalanced,” “hysterical,” or even 
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“suicidal.”5 At the same time, radicals sought adventures and thrills, and the revolution provided 
an opportunity to fulfill these desires. These individuals, hardly devoted to any cause, 
nevertheless committed the majority of terrorist attacks in this decade.  
This analysis includes expropriations, committed in the name of the revolution, as a form 
of terrorism. By including expropriations within the grouping of terrorist activities, it is feasible 
to conclude most terrorist attacks in Russia were committed by criminals and not revolutionary 
ideologues.6 This is not to say that true revolutionaries, particularly from the lower and 
uneducated masses, did not exist. And in the face of repression from the Russian autocracy, 
many whole-heartedly believed in the cause they were fighting for. With that said, this chapter 
focuses on the political violence committed by revolutionaries which was inherently criminal—
intended to benefit the individual and not the revolution. In no manner is this approach meant to 
provide a holistic picture of revolutionary organizations and their activities in the early twentieth 
century. 
In order to commit violence on such a massive scale, terrorists justified their exploits 
through the ideology of revolutionary parties. In such an environment, individuals could defend 
their use of murder and expropriations in the name of the revolution. As the atmosphere 
devolved and became more violent, revolutionaries used the opportunity to commit these acts for 
their own personal benefit or enjoyment. In fact, a portion of the terrorists could not even 
adequately express the creed of the party they supposedly were fighting for.7 Nonetheless, they 
still wielded the ideology to commit heinous crimes, and some organizations even encouraged 
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revolutionaries to commit large scale indiscriminate terror as a tool to cleanse and purify the 
population. This purification, it was thought, would eliminate enemies and nonbelievers in order 
to lead Russia on the path to socialism. 
 
Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries 
By the beginning of the twentieth century, the People’s Will no longer existed. Their 
mantle of adopting political assassinations in the struggle against the government continued with 
the formation of the Party of Socialists-Revolutionaries (SRs) in 1901. Of the leftist 
revolutionary parties, the SRs were the only ones which “formally incorporated terrorist tactics 
into its program.”8 As it turned out, other revolutionary organizations used terrorism as a 
political weapon, but at the same time they theoretically decried its effectiveness.9 Orthodox 
Marxism, which both the SRs and the Social Democrats adhered to, indicated individual actions 
and deeds did not influence historical development. In this light, political assassinations appeared 
to be against Marxist doctrine. The SRs, however, argued their primary objective was not 
individual terror but the revolution; therefore, political assassinations were inseparable from the 
cause and the “general struggle of the toiling masses.”10 Many radicals still held a strong belief 
terrorism could be used as a rallying cry to awaken the Russian people. The continued theoretical 
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disputes and ongoing interparty fighting caused revolutionaries at this time to view the SRs as a 
party of action which could produce immediate results.11  
Given their theoretical backing for the use of terror as a form of struggle against the 
government, the SR organization grew and garnered significant financial support. By openly 
adhering to a pro-terrorist stance, radicals supporting and willing to use political violence flocked 
to the organization. Some left the Social Democrats in order to do so. In his memoirs, Boris 
Savinkov discussed his role as an SR with another member. He was asked,  
- “Do you want to take part in terror?” 
- “Yes.” 
- Only in terror?” 
- “Yes.” 
- “Why not the general work?” 
- I said that I attached crucial importance to terror.12 
 
While radicals joined the SRs in larger numbers, simultaneously the organization amassed 
substantial financial support from benefactors less willing to donate large sums to fringe terrorist 
groups. They opened their pocketbooks to what they viewed as an organized political party.13 On 
a scale unseen in Russia before, this financial backing allowed the SRs to purchase countless 
weapons and build explosives. Bombs and bomb-making shops were so common in Russia these 
small devices entered the general vocabulary as “oranges.”14 While not yet matched, the 
development of revolutionary weaponry diminished the technical advantages the government 
held in warfare at this time. Their growing support also meant the establishment of an 
international party network capable of smuggling arms into the country.15  
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Instead of concentrating on the elimination of the tsar like the People’s Will had done in 
the nineteenth century, the SRs first focused on assassinating high public officials. They did so 
taking active precautions to minimize collateral damage, meaning they preferred “revolvers to 
bombs.”16 While not all of the terrorists at this time were similarly as vigilant, the liberal public 
often deemed the actions of the Combat Organization of the SRs as virtuous. As Susan Morrissey 
indicated: “This was the era of the “avengers”: lone heroes courageously assassinating evildoers 
in the tsarist administration, turning the courtroom into a site of political resistance, and 
sacrificing themselves on the scaffold, ideally producing daring letters or poetry in the 
interim.”17 The story of Ivan Kaliaev and his aborted attempt on the life of Grand Duke Sergei 
Alexandrovich on February 15, 1905 exemplified this outlook. Kaliaev, in position to toss his 
bomb into the oncoming carriage, stopped once he noticed the Grand Duke’s wife and nephews 
inside the cab with him. Two days later, he succeeded in his attempt, and the general public 
looked on in condemnation of the victim and approval of the assassin as the bomb blew the 
Grand Duke’s body into several pieces strewn across a Moscow street.18  
Kaliaev’s refusal to murder those considered “innocent” attested to at least some moral 
aptitude of the terrorists. The Grand Duke represented the oppression and violence of the 
government which they viewed as an indiscriminate killing machine, particularly after the events 
of Bloody Sunday. The revolutionaries saw his assassination as a defensive and reactionary 
response to the ongoing situation at the time. Increasingly, the public perceived the terrorists not 
as the guilty party, but rather hailed them as heroes and concurrently judged the government 
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unjust.19 Even though the radicals committed murder and often rejected any feelings of remorse 
or repudiation, they seemingly sacrificed themselves for the benefit of the masses, and the people 
took notice. After arrests, revolutionaries used the public trials to express the moral basis for 
their terrorism in the face of repression and state violence. A prosecutor witnessing the hanging 
of some revolutionaries observed, “How these people died…no sighs, no remorse, no pleas, no 
signs of weaknesses… These were real heroes.”20 Given the public reception of terrorism, 
violence took prominence on the revolutionary scene. Even Kaliev “dreamed of a future of terror 
and its decisive influence on the revolution,” as he famously stated “SRs without bombs are not 
SRs.”21 Consequently, the moral basis and support for committing acts of violence triggered an 
increase in the use of terror among revolutionaries. As terrorism spread it created an atmosphere 
leading to its application in a more reckless and indiscriminate manner.22 
The revolutionaries perceived the support of liberal intellectuals as validation for their 
actions, causing an increase in the resort to violence. The intelligentsia, after all, had the same 
goal in mind as the terrorist revolutionaries: the ultimate overthrow of tsarist Russia. While most 
intellectuals abhorred the violence and destruction, they also saw how its impact awakened the 
public while causing disarray in the ranks of the government. Their support, or even silent 
disapproval, was enough justification for the masses to soon fall in line with the terrorists.23 “The 
liberal intelligentsia thus promoted a culture in which, under the impact of fabricated reverence 
for terror, common people came to venerate terrorists’ portraits, as if they were icons.”24 The 
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Constitutional Democrats (Kadets), consisting of educated professionals, openly condemned 
terrorism as a method while at the same time extolling the individual terrorists as martyrs for the 
cause and celebrating their successes.25 The intelligentsia thus led the way for the general 
romanticizing of terrorism. This outlook inspired the public, particularly the youth who admired 
individual terrorists and dreamed of growing up to fight the regime.26 
 
The Evolution of Terrorism 
As the use of political violence exploded on the scene in the year 1905, the terrorists 
increasingly started to operate outside of any theoretical dimensions and party networks. In 1902, 
the SRs formed the Combat Organization as the terrorist faction of their party. As a small unit 
within the organization, they oversaw single cadres of terrorists, and in many ways resembled the 
Executive Committee of the People’s Will. They functioned in the strictest sense of secrecy and 
were for the most part removed from SR members and leadership. This isolation impacted 
individuals of the group by making “solidarity among themselves” more important than “loyalty 
to the party.”27 Increasingly, members of the Combat Organization grew frustrated with the 
Party, viewing them only as useless politicians and not true revolutionary fighters.28 This was 
particularly evident when Party leadership attempted to regulate how terrorism was to be 
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employed. Members of the Combat Organization saw this as an infringement of their efforts by 
those unwilling to risk their lives for the cause. In disregard to a Party statute granting the right 
to choose targets solely to the leadership, they began to conduct political assassinations without 
consulting the Central Committee. They violated this principle to allegedly maintain the secrecy 
of the Combat Organization, but also because they “considered such matters beyond the 
competence of anyone not directly involved with terror.”29 As one radical stated: “I believe in 
terror. For me, the whole revolution is in terror.”30 
Similar to the SRs, terrorists from other revolutionary organizations also increasingly 
broke from the direction of their parties. One group which was particularly affected by this was 
the Social Democrats (SDs). Contrary to the Socialists-Revolutionaries, the SDs thought 
individual acts of terror went against the principles of Marxism. At first, they used Marxist 
doctrine to criticize and condemn the SRs and their adherence to violence. After witnessing the 
effectiveness of the SRs in disabling the government, however, some theoreticians of the party 
altered course. By 1905, Lenin had changed his mind about terrorism. He now believed political 
violence was appropriate given the historical moment and the ability of terrorism to be utilized in 
coordination with the movement. In fact, he now strongly advocated for its use, calling it “the 
duty of every person” to attack the police, spies and government officials.31 Without any central 
terrorist committee such as the Combat Organization leading the SRs, small units in the SDs 
commenced attacks with more or less full autonomy. While by 1905 Lenin had accepted the use 
of political violence, the Menshevik faction still argued against terrorism citing their 
interpretation of Marxism in defense. This outlook, however, did not stop them from praising, 
                                                          
29 Giefman, Thou Shalt Kill, 50. 
30 Savinkov, “Вспоминания террориста.” 
31 Giefman, Thou Shalt Kill, 91. 
39 
aiding, and even committing acts of economic terrorism, often leaving the details unknown to the 
leadership.32 
As terrorists more and more operated outside of organizational networks, they also 
started to ignore party doctrine on the acceptable uses of terrorism. The Combat Organization of 
the SRs disbanded in 1907, but this did not mean the party abandoned terrorism as tool for 
revolution. 33 Instead, they relied on smaller combat units or isolated individuals to perform 
attacks. As Anna Geifman indicated: “The smaller combat units came to represent the new type 
of terrorist in their largely indiscriminate behavior and increasing callousness toward bloodshed, 
as well as in the composition of their ranks, which included many individuals who could not be 
considered conscious revolutionaries and socialists.”34 These units, such as the Northern Flying 
Combat Detachment led by Al’bert Trauberg, held themselves to far less scrupulous standards 
compared with Ivan Kaliaev or members of the Combat Organization. Instead of selecting their 
targets from state leaders who knowingly committed atrocities, Trauberg’s plans included the 
assassination of officials “en masse not for any particular offense, but merely because of their 
positions.”35 Kaliaev targeted the Grand Duke because he was a former dictatorial governor of 
Moscow and advisor to the tsar. These smaller units, however, did not adhere to any strict 
selection process. And while Kaliaev aborted his first attempt because he would have harmed 
innocent bystanders, these new terrorists strapped bombs to their bodies and carelessly tossed 
grenades towards their targets with little concern for collateral damage. As one revolutionary 
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terrorist who had accidentally killed a schoolgirl in an attack stated: “I am very sorry about this, 
but it is impossible not to have innocent victims in a time of war.”36 
The justifications for the use of terrorism expanded over the course of 1905-1910 to 
eventually accept and encourage indiscriminate violence and murder. This fits with what Martin 
Miller calls “ordinary terrorism.”37 According to Miller’s definition, sovereign states and their 
civilians are continually in a discourse over citizen rights. Often times this interchange escalates 
into violence if one side is unfairly represented in the conversation. Without a solution to the 
conflict, the violence becomes more and more extreme in nature. In Russia, as revolutionaries 
responded to the repression of the state with violence of their own, the autocracy answered in 
return by implementing more repressive measures, forcing the revolutionaries to retaliate, again, 
in kind. As Susan Morrissey pointed out: “Even as Kaliev’s self-restraint seemingly embodies 
the principle of setting moral limits, his example also became a rallying cry promoting an ever-
expanding field of combat.”38 In reaction to the events which led to Bloody Sunday, terrorists 
felt morally justified in their use of violence against the state. Instead of working with the social 
forces of change, the government responded in a manner of vicious suppression. In mid-June, 
government soldiers attacked striking workers in Odessa, along with the crew of the Potemkin, 
leaving an estimated 2,000 dead and 3,000 injured.39 In the Moscow Uprising later that year in 
December, over 1,000 Muscovites died at the hands of Russian troops, including 86 children.40  
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By the time the government issued the October Manifesto41 in 1905, it was already too 
late, not to mention the fact it failed to address real systemic problems or create a peaceful path 
to socialism. As a result, the “Russian struggle against the “siege” of the autocracy was entering 
a new phase.”42 The wave of reactionary violence against the guilt-ridden government only 
increased in barbarity. “The Kaliaev case had become a reference point among SRs justifying an 
open-ended spiral of violence rather than self-restraint. Indeed, its very articulation of moral 
limits came to demonstrate the absence of absolute limits.”43 The Maximalists, a terrorist branch 
which evolved out of the body of the SRs, were indicative of this new wave of violence. 
 
The Maximalists 
After the October Manifesto, the SRs temporarily halted their terrorist activity. They 
practiced this cessation of hostilities mainly in theory, since the independent terrorist factions of 
the SRs disregarded the statute. The Maximalists, discouraged the Party would issue such a 
decree, decided to branch off from the SRs at this time. At their first conference after splitting 
with the Party at large, they voted to move towards institutional rather than individual acts of 
violence. The Party concluded: “Where it is not enough to remove one person, it is necessary to 
eliminate them by the dozen; where dozens are not enough, they must be gotten rid of in 
hundreds.”44 This type of outlook left no room for the concern of innocent civilians. On August 
12, 1906, the Maximalists made an attempt on the life of Prime Minister Pyotr Stolypin: three 
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members blew themselves up with sixteen pound bombs at Stolypin’s villa. The terrorists 
purposefully waited until his visiting hours, when it was easiest to reach the Prime Minister, but 
also when everyday civilians were in close proximity. As it turned out, Stolypin survived the 
blast, but up to 60 others, including women and the elderly, were killed along with numerous 
injured.45 In response to this attack, the government began its “single most controversial policy 
of repression,” by opening military field courts which could try, convict, and execute civilians 
accused of political crimes within four days of arrest.46 
Part of the reason the Maximalists decidedly made the move to kill on such a large scale 
had to do with how they justified mass murder in their ideology. One of the theoreticians of the 
Party, Ivan Pavlov, wrote a pamphlet in 1907 called The Purification of Mankind. According to 
Pavlov, those born to rule and in control of the levers of power consisted of a different “ethical 
race” than the rest of mankind. He equated them and their covetous greed to “morally inferior” 
predators. At the same time, Pavlov believed these negative traits were somehow inherited and 
transmitted from generation to generation. Accordingly, he drew a clear and distinct line in the 
sand dividing society into two groups. Pavlov argued the only way to stop these individuals from 
corrupting the world was to eliminate their entire “race.” In essence, he advocated for a total civil 
war.47 Although the Maximalists never adopted Pavlov’s theory as part of the formal program, 
they still considered him a primary theoretician in the Party. Other Maximalists, such as M.A. 
Engel’gardt, held similar views. Engel’gardt indicated it would be necessary to eliminate what he 
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estimated to be 12 million land and factory owners, bankers and priests.48 The future order of 
society depended upon it. 
 Even if Pavlov’s ideology did not fully direct the agenda of the Maximalists, it represents 
how in certain organizations the “martyrology” and the stress revolutionaries earlier placed on 
moral superiority was substituted with a “language of purification” encouraging violence.49 The 
Maximalists expressed outrage when the SR leaders called for a halt of terrorist activity 
immediately following the October Manifesto. According to their ideology, parliamentary 
politics and political reform could not fix society’s issues. Only systemic change and a “full-
fledged socialist transformation” would free the people.50 One Maximalist justified the death of 
innocent civilians in the attack on Stolypin by indicating they were “figures involved in the cause 
of the oppression of the people, whether directly or indirectly, and they are not worthy or 
deserving of sympathy.”51 According to this revolutionary, the victims of the attack were not 
“innocent” at all. This viewpoint more less insinuates anyone, whether knowingly or not, could 
be classified as a target for attack simply because of their situation and status in society. Thus, 
the Maximalists constructed a very binary outlook not too far off from Pavlov’s theory. In this 
manner, they justified large scale attacks and indiscriminate murder in an attempt to cleanse 
society of perceived enemies in preparation for the oncoming socialist revolution. 
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The Anarchists 
In no other organizations was indiscriminate murder more accepted than among those of 
the Anarchists. Even though they numbered far fewer than the SRs and the SDs, their terrorism 
resulted in the majority of the casualties between 1901-1910.52 While certain Anarchist leaders 
like Petr Kropotkin argued against the use of terrorism and its ability to effect change in the 
sociopolitical order, the majority of Anarchists viewed it as a useful weapon.53 And since no 
unified Anarchist Party existed, but rather separate groups adhered to the ideology, the use of 
terrorism was left mostly to the individual. As a central tenet of anarchism, some of these groups 
believed the application of indiscriminate and reckless violence required no justification. 
According to the ideology, in order to build a better future, society first needed to be broken 
apart and its inherent beliefs destroyed. In this manner, the use of violence was employed as a 
tool to undermine and overthrow the current system. No matter how small the act of terror, it still 
aided in the takeover of the government and breakdown of society.54  
Under these circumstances, “violence no longer required immediate and direct 
justification; anyone wearing a uniform was considered a representative of the government camp 
and was therefore subject to execution at any moment as an enemy of the people.”55 This is how 
the Anarchists-Individuals proclaimed themselves “free to attack and kill anyone” even if only 
for “personal gratification” since it “contributed to the destruction of the bourgeois world in its 
own way.”56 The Anarchists commonly targeted everyday policeman. When patrolling the 
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streets, they were liable to get acid flung in their faces.57 Since they considered the system of 
capitalism itself an enemy, Anarchists freely attacked factory owners, directors, managers, and 
merchants. Professionals and specialists of any kind, such as engineers and technicians, were 
also subject to violence.58 The Anarchists thus took ideology to an extreme level; certain radicals 
attacked individuals who “simply appeared more fortunate in their economic status” and “were 
relatively well dressed.”59 These extremists threw bombs into restaurants, train cars, and theatres 
simply because the patrons could seemingly afford the fare.60 
Disgruntled revolutionaries from the SDs or SRs frequently left to fill the ranks of 
Anarchist groups. Mostly young and restless, and from the lower strata of society, the rebellious 
nature of these young men and women prevented them from conforming to a structured political 
organization. Many felt parties like the SDs and the SRs preferred to engage in political debate, 
which they did not have the patience or desire for, and strayed from the real revolutionary action. 
Often from working-class backgrounds, those joining with the Anarchists had little education 
and were unconcerned with intellectual matters.61 Since on the surface anarchism offered a 
platform for unrestrained destruction, the ideology could suit their desires without any theoretical 
backing. It was “entirely typical” an Anarchist “who engaged in casual conversation with a 
comrade, could not defend his revolutionary views” and “was unaware of the differences among 
the programs of the existing political parties.”62 This situation was not unique to just the 
Anarchists, but occurred in most revolutionary parties. Former working class men carried out 
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approximately 70 percent of SR terrorist attacks, and this number was even higher in other 
radical groups.63 In essence, by joining an Anarchist outfit, these individuals put ideology and 
tactics aside to more or less engage in thrill-seeking revolutionary activity. Therefore, their use 
of violence had little to do with a conviction terror was tied to the revolutionary struggle of the 
masses. Some, as one radical put it, held an “extremely obscure perception of the revolution,”64 
calling for revenge against the government and capitalists referred to in the commoner slang as 
“scoundrels” and “jerks.”65 
 
Expropriations, Thrill-Seeking and Sadism 
For certain radicals, the ideology of the party they supported was nothing more than a 
useful tool to justify their appetites for adventure, riches, and even murder.66 As one 
revolutionary stated: “I cannot live peacefully. I like danger, so as to feel the thrill.”67  As has 
been previously discussed, terrorist units in the SDs and SRs continually violated and ignored 
their party’s doctrine on the acceptable uses of terrorism. They felt party leaders were too 
concerned with theoretical issues, when the only effective means to winning the revolution were 
real action and fighting. At the same time, radicals also used the ideology to justify actions which 
hardly could be considered aiding the revolutionary struggle. As Anna Geifman stated: “Doctrine 
is the extremists’ mouthpiece to validate a purpose; it is not the purpose; it is a means, not the 
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end.”68 Revolutionary activity, supported and financed by a party, provided rebellious, un-
educated youths the opportunity to act lawlessly as long as it was in the name of the ideology. 
This created a community of daring individuals who felt anything was permissible, even 
violence, if cloaked in the ideological language of the party. The goals of the party took a 
secondary role to individual desires. If tasked with a risky mission, some terrorists questioned 
why they would sacrifice their lives today for the future of society, believing to do so would be 
“plainly foolish.”69 This does not sound like a dedicated revolutionary, but instead someone 
exploiting a situation for personal gain. More than willing to risk their lives for the opportunities 
the revolution provided, many of which were financially motivated, the concept of doing so for 
the future of society they deemed inconceivable. 
Across most organizations, revolutionaries in the twentieth century commonly committed 
expropriations. Between January 1905 and July 1906, officials recorded close to 2,000 major 
robberies with political motivations.70 The Anarchists often justified expropriations in their 
ideology. The Beznachal’tsy organization believed true Anarchists satisfied their basic material 
needs of survival by stealing from the wealthy.71 They legitimized theft of this nature by linking 
this criminal act to the destruction of capitalist society. From this type of outlook, “many 
anarchist groups deteriorated into semicriminal gangs occupied primarily with robbery and 
looting for personal profit,” and “they merely used anarchist rhetoric to justify pure banditry.”72 
In Warsaw, “Jewish gangsters disguised as “anarcho-Communists” broke into affluent 
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residences, “expropriating” money and whatever else struck their fancy.”73 The chaotic 
atmosphere at this time provided an opportune moment for this type of activity, and its 
recurrence created difficulty to discern the difference between a criminal and a revolutionary.   
Whereas the SDs and SRs primarily stole from banks and other institutions, Anarchists 
had no problem stealing from individuals. They chose victims from the bourgeoisie based on 
their perceptions of wealth and status. Stealing from members of high society could be justified 
in the ideology because certain Anarchists classified them as mortal enemies promoting a 
capitalist system. Once again, countless individuals abused the ideology and took it to the 
extreme. There are recorded occurrences of self-proclaimed Anarchists stealing and terrorizing 
the poor, both on purpose and by accident. In one instance, a group of Anarchists bombed a café 
in Odessa on December 17, 1905. They effectively killed 12 people, destroyed the building, and 
made the front page news. If they intended to target the bourgeoisie, however, they failed since 
the café was actually a second-class establishment frequented by none other than the 
intelligentsia.74 In another instance in Odessa, a group of Anarchists robbed an old woman forced 
to selling lemons on the street. In the end, they murdered her simply for putting up a fuss.75 
Accordingly, Anarchists perceived these crimes “as progressive steps contributing to the 
destabilization of the sociopolitical order,” when in truth they had little to do with the end goal of 
revolution.76 
Members of the SDs and the SRs also committed similar crimes and were drawn to this 
type of work for the opportunities it provided. The SR Central Committee approved of the 
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expropriation of funds and weapons belonging to the state as long as the Central Committee 
planned and directed the activities. Nevertheless, SR terrorists often disregarded this statute by 
continually expropriating private property without any direction by the proper channels. Because 
these funds were vital to the finances of the organization, the Party either attempted to cover up 
this type of banditry or ignored it altogether. The proliferation of expropriations, however, 
harmed the organization’s prestige as a true revolutionary outfit.77  
Of the SDs, Lenin was the only leader willing to decree robbery acceptable in the name 
of the revolution.78 The RSDRP Stockholm Congress in 1906 rejected expropriations of private 
property, similar to the SRs. They feared this type of activity would make the Party look like its 
ranks consisted of bandits instead of revolutionaries.79 But this decree did not stop individuals, 
particularly the Bolsheviks, from committing these acts. They attacked banks, post offices, 
factory administration buildings, liquor stores, and diners. They did so typically without 
notifying leadership, and to the fear of the Party, “their actions quickly came to bear a strong 
resemblance to those of common criminals.”80 The recurrence of Bolshevik expropriations of 
both private and state property soon gave them a steep financial advantage compared to others, 
most noticeably the Mensheviks. Because of these events, the Mensheviks decried the use of 
expropriations, and in 1907 the Fifth Party Congress outlawed all involvement in terrorist 
activities including banditry. This ban had little practical effect on the Bolsheviks, however, as 
they continued to commit these acts by claiming the terrorists were not members of the Party, 
even though the majority of the spoils went directly to Lenin.81 
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As banditry spread amongst the revolutionaries and across parties, the activity 
degenerated to a point where certain individuals clearly used revolutionary ideology as a scheme 
to get rich. Anarchists acted like “gangster bands, occupied primarily with robbery, extortion, 
and looting for personal profit.”82 Some “freedom fighters” committed expropriations to live and 
sustain “corrupt” lifestyles consisting of heavy alcohol consumption and debauchery.83 The 
ability to steal large amounts of money in the name of the revolution drew seedy characters with 
criminal backgrounds. They used the ideology simply to satisfy their gluttonous appetite. 
Increasingly, these individuals failed to deliver their spoils to the party originally stolen for, and 
instead split up the money amongst themselves.84 In 1906, a Georgian Socialists-Federalists 
revolutionary named Kereselidze and his crew expropriated 315,000 rubles from the Dushet 
Treasury. Instead of giving these funds to the Party, or even splitting it up with the members of 
his outfit, Kereselidze took the money and moved to Geneva to retire and hang up his 
revolutionary jacket.85 Due to prolific examples like Kereselidze, the public increasingly 
regarded revolutionaries in a far more negative light. 
 As radicals rivaled common criminals in their conduct, the prestige revolutionary parties 
once held began to significantly diminish. As noted, by 1907 the SDs outlawed expropriations 
and terrorism, not only because the sole benefactor was the Bolshevik faction, but also because 
of the harm it was causing to the Party’s image. After the ban on expropriations, the Bolsheviks 
still prepared and conducted operations, such as one in Tiflis which they projected to haul in two 
to four million rubles. While this operation never took place, they understood the potential 
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consequences of it, and were prepared to “renounce the practice publicly with the hope of saving 
the party’s image.”86 The SRs attempted to combat this felonious element by expelling criminals 
from the Party.87 The Anarchists, since there was no central party leadership to denounce them, 
were by far the worst of the organizations where criminality flourished. By 1908, some 
Anarchists admitted the early idealism of their movement had waned and “drowned in a sea of 
banditry.” It is no wonder then why other radicals generally referred to the Anarchists as “the 
scum of the revolution.”88 
While greed influenced criminals to become revolutionaries, others drawn to radical 
parties could be classified as mentally unfit, insane, or sadistic. There are countless recorded 
instances of unprovoked brutality by revolutionaries amongst each other and their victims: these 
include physical beatings, torture, and killing for fun.89 “It became favored entertainment” for 
certain revolutionaries “to open fire at soldiers or Cossacks and to throw bombs into the police 
barracks,” or “throw sulfuric acid in the face of the first policeman encountered on the street.”90 
In one instance, a Maximalist rang the doorbell at the apartment of a policeman, and then shot 
randomly leaving three dead.91 In undertaking a profession where “all means were permissible” 
as long as they seemingly advanced the revolutionary cause, radical organizations provided an 
outlet in political terrorism for those inclined to sadistic behavior.  
                                                          
86 See Geifman, Thou Shalt Kill, 116. 
87 See ibid., 77. 
88 See ibid., 152. 
89 For specific examples of this type of behavior, see ibid., 166-173. 
90 Geifman, Death Orders, 32. 
91 See ibid., 32. 
52 
Living in an environment surrounded by death and the fear of being caught by the police 
had a major psychological impact on some revolutionaries.92 Existing in complete isolation from 
society, radicals lost the ability to relate to other human beings. The act of terror was their only 
association with livelihood. The Maximalist Tat’iana Lenot’eva shot and killed a 70-year-old 
man staying in the same hotel as her because he resembled the former Minister of the Interior she 
had once been plotting to assassinate.93 Sofia Khrenkova, a mother of three, became psychotic 
after her arrest, and set herself on fire in a prison cell.94  
For those causing bloodshed, if at first difficult, submersion in this environment led to 
normalization. Soon, revolutionaries increasingly expressed indifference and disassociation to 
violence. In one example, several revolutionaries lured a suspected traitor away from town, and 
without giving him a chance to defend himself, took turns stabbing the man with a knife, with 
each perpetrator passing the victim on to the next. The official report indicated they “enjoyed 
cutting his throat” and later “attempted to decapitate him.”95 Some celebrated terrorism as a 
sport, competing with others in their overall body counts, calling themselves “woodchoppers.”96 
This utter dehumanization of individuals, legitimized by ideology, and exploding in the midst of 
the revolution, turned victims into numbers, and revolutionaries into executioners. 
Anna Geifman contended the cruelness and indifference to murder revolutionary 
terrorists expressed was unique in Russia to the twentieth century.97 Thanks to the work of 
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Richard Pipes and Norman Naimark, however, this type of behavior has proven to be evident in 
the nineteenth century as well. Both scholars discussed how revolutionaries prior to the turn of 
the century used ideology as a justification to commit violence for the sake of violence itself. 
Naimark pointed out how the “psychologically unstable activists of the 1880s gravitated to both 
the terrorist and Jacobin solutions.”98 Similarly, he indicated the foot soldiers actually 
committing terrorist actions, or “the bomb-throwers and the spotters” as he called them, “cared 
little for ideology and were motivated simply by “extreme hatred” for the government.”99 Pipes 
went even further by suggesting the terrorists typically “displayed suicidal tendencies” and “gave 
no evidence of feeling remorse about killing people who have personally done them no harm.”100 
He drew the conclusion the terrorist factions fashioned an atmosphere where violence for its own 
sake could proliferate. He stated: 
A sizable body of the young is seized by an overpowering destructive urge which, at the 
same time, exhibits self-destructive symptoms. When this happens, the ostensible 
objective—an ideal political and social order—serves but as a pretext for resort to 
violence: violence, ostensibly the means to an end, becomes an end in itself.101 
 
The wielding of ideology precipitated the escalation of violence in 1905-1910. It 
increasingly justified more and more extreme terrorist and criminal behavior. Without ideology, 
these events could only be perceived as criminal acts, some of which bordered on sadism. The 
fact radicals committed them in the name of a revolution, however, made these men not the 
gangsters and bandits they should appropriately be called, but instead “freedom fighters.” 
Indeed, the Anarchists were the worst perpetrators using ideology to legitimize almost any act of 
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violence, no matter how remote or extreme. Similarly, the Maximalists’ dichotomous view of the 
world permitted and encouraged large scale terrorism, including the murder of innocent civilians. 
At the same time, the individuals committing these actions fit a very specific profile: young, 
restless, impoverished, adventure seeking, uneducated, and some even mentally unstable. The 
SRs and the SDs specifically sought these type of men who were “ready for everything.”102 
These individuals supported by party ideology were paramount in conducting the terrorist 
activity which wreaked havoc on the government in the early twentieth century. 
The works of Naimark and Pipes, as well as Martin Miller’s research on “ordinary 
terrorism,” have shown us the sadistic and criminal behavior of the revolutionaries was not 
isolated to the first decade of the twentieth century. Nor should we then assume the atmosphere 
and ideology used to contribute to this behavior was contained to this time period. The utter 
disregard for human life is similarly seen in Russia during the state terror of the 1930s. 
Accordingly, parallels appear between these two time periods, even though they represent 
different forms and categorizations of terror.103 It is probable Stalin, as a young Bolshevik who 
partook in the revolutionary fervor rampant in 1905-1908, learned a great deal about the uses of 
ideologically driven violence at this time. And it is for these reasons Anna Geifman stated:  
“It is worth speculating whether it is simply a historical coincidence that in the twentieth 
century, which has been dominated by totalitarian ideology and persecutions…the initial 
traits of totalitarianism were in evidence among the revolutionary extremists in Russia, 
and in particular among the Maximalists.”104 
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The next chapter thus discusses Stalin’s involvement in the terrorism and banditry of the first 
decade of the twentieth century, and proposes ways this shaped him moving forward. 
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CHAPTER III: STALIN THE GANGSTER, 1905-1908 
On June 13, 1907, revolutionaries attacked two mail coaches carrying hundreds of 
thousands of rubles destined for the Tiflis branch of the State Bank. Leading the charge was the 
notorious Simon “Kamo” Ter-Petrosyan, a close friend of Stalin’s since they grew up together in 
the town of Gori. Twenty members comprised the outfit. Most of them were part of Stalin’s 
battle squad. The revolutionaries tossed multiple bombs; Kamo threw two of his own which 
annihilated three guards, two bank employees, and many innocent bystanders. After neutralizing 
the threat of the guards, he entered the coach and stole 250,000 rubles, a spectacular sum for a 
heist, and the largest the Bolsheviks would conduct. Fleeing by train with his pretend bride (a 
member of the gang in disguise), Kamo personally delivered the money to Lenin in Finland. All 
in all, the radicals murdered three dozen people in the heist and wounded up to 50 others.1  
The Tiflis robbery is one well documented account of an expropriation where Stalin’s 
role was clear; although he did not participate, “he was instrumental in plotting the heist,” a 
specialty of which he thrived at between the years 1905 and 1908.2 Along with picking members 
of the raid who were part of his gang known as “the Outfit,” he also groomed a bank clerk and 
courted a friend working for the banking mail office. Some observers, including P.A. Pavlenko, 
an author during the dictator’s lifetime, indicated Stalin had attacked the carriage himself and 
had been wounded by a bomb.3 While this has yet to be disproven, it is highly unlikely Stalin 
took part in the robbery, the same as many other expropriations he conducted from afar.4 
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Stalin’s life before becoming the undisputed leader of the Soviet Union has been 
analyzed more thoroughly than almost any other state leader. Until 1990 and the opening of the 
Soviet archives, however, scholars more or less speculated his role in certain events, given the 
limitations of primary evidence. The fall of the Soviet Union and the opening of the archives 
generated a renewed interest in Stalin in all facets of his life. Researchers could now 
comparatively verify or discredit details which were one time surmised. With this plethora of 
information in the hands of scholars, little research has been conducted on Stalin’s role from 
1905-1908 as a Red Brigade leader and trusted revolutionary terrorist of Lenin. The one 
exception to this is Simon Sebag Montefiore’s Young Stalin published in 2007. 
One reason there is little scholarship analyzing this period of his life can be ascribed to 
Stalin’s efforts to hide it from the record. Since no one claimed responsibility for the Tiflis heist 
described above, the Mensheviks launched investigations to find out the cause, and the two 
inside-men recruited by Stalin gave up his name. Though no recorded evidence of his 
involvement existed, the Tiflis Committee expelled him from the Party.5 This fact has been 
confirmed in an article written in 1918 by the Menshevik Martov.6 Stalin needed the credentials 
of a long standing Bolshevik in order to defeat Trotsky and secure his succession as leader after 
Lenin’s death in 1924. Thus, he did everything he could to conceal his role in the expropriations, 
even launching a libel case against Martov. Accordingly, Stalin conducted an effort to expunge 
from the official record any known mention of his activity in the assassinations and robberies 
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between 1905 and 1908.7 Such was the case with Kote Tsintsadze’s diary. A chief gangster in 
one of Stalin’s units, and later a staunch opponent, Tsintsadze wrote a detailed description of 
Stalin’s role as a Red Brigade leader in his published memoirs in 1924. When they were 
republished in 1927, Stalin had already consolidated power, and ordered the deletion of the 
passages which referenced these events.8 His role as a revolutionary terrorist thus began to 
disappear, and for this reason little evidence exists on the topic, discouraging further research. 
Simon Sebag Montefiore has successfully brought to light the extent to which Stalin had 
become a “gangster” in his activities from 1905-1908. Drawing from memoirs and sources in the 
Georgian archives, as well as what became available after the opening of the Soviet archives, 
Montefiore constructed a map of Stalin’s activities during this time period. According to 
Montefiore, Stalin not only directed expropriations but also ordered political assassinations.9 
Stephen Kotkin, on the other hand, claimed while Stalin was undoubtedly involved in “hostage 
taking for ransom, protection rackets, piracy, and, perhaps, a few assassinations,” his 
involvement in planned murder was minor compared to others in the Caucuses.10 Moreover, he 
hinted Montefiore’s work romanticized Stalin’s exploits as a revolutionary fighter during these 
early years. Even if this is the case, Stalin himself stated during his time as a Red Brigade leader: 
“I received my second baptism in revolutionary combat.”11 While some of the conclusions 
Montefiore drew about Stalin’s direct participation might only come from single sources, thus 
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making their accuracy hard to confirm, nevertheless he painted a picture which is hard to deny of 
an early terrorist surrounding himself with like-minded criminals. 
 
Lenin’s Trusted Terrorist Leader 
During 1905-1908, Stalin primarily worked as a leader of Bolshevik terrorist factions in 
the Caucuses. Similar to other revolutionary extremists during this time, his outfits conducted 
large and small expropriations, created protection rackets, kidnapped wealthy individuals and 
held them for ransom, and committed other feats which could fill the Party coffers. “Stalin 
became the effective godfather of a small but useful fund-raising operation that really resembled 
a moderately successful Mafia family.”12 The members of his gangs exemplified the typical 
revolutionary type in the first decade of the twentieth century; for the most part, they consisted of 
uneducated criminals and thrill-seekers willing to kill at moment’s notice. At the same time, the 
radicals in his units used ideology to justify their exploits. During these years, Stalin underwent 
his true revolutionary education, and we can see how the foundation for the Great Terror he 
unleashed in the 1930s was starting to be built. 
The only direct participation with expropriations Stalin might have been involved in was 
the piracy of the steamship Tsarevich Giorgi in 1906. Fleeing the scene of the crime, the robbers 
hid in a safe house which one revolutionary and his father, Kamshish Gvaramia, owned and were 
residing. As an old man, Gvaramia stated he was tasked to “hide the pockmarked chieftain of the 
gang that held up the mail-ship off Cape Kodori who subsequently became leader of this great 
country.”13 Later, locals of Abkhazia, a region the bandits passed through, told the historian Fasil 
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Iskander how Stalin ordered the murders of the unreliable gangsters in the heist and fled with the 
cash on packhorses to catch the train to Tiflis.14 There is some credibility to this statement, since 
Stalin was known on multiple occasions to have transported stolen cash by packhorses across the 
countryside. After the heist, the police description of the pirate chieftain resembled Stalin in 
looks and mannerisms.15 This information, along with the fact Stalin was familiar with the area 
and the dates fit perfectly with an absence in his active schedule, led Montefiore to conclude 
“there is no documentary proof of Stalin’s role, but his participation is at the very least highly 
probable.”16 Other memoirs of the period, however, claim Stalin did not participate in the raid, 
but rather organized it like countless others.17 
Similar to a mob boss, Stalin typically kept himself removed from the ordinary gangsters, 
issuing his instructions through one or two trusted allies, such as Kamo.18 His units were 
responsible for “conducting shakedowns, currency counterfeiting, extortion, bank robberies, 
piracy and protection rackets.”19 Given this unlawful activity, Stalin continually felt the need to 
emphasize to both comrades and others he and those in his outfit were “revolutionaries through 
and through, not criminals.”20 Like so many other radicals at this time, Stalin and his units 
employed ideology to legitimize their illegal actions and conduct criminal activities; however, 
unlike other supposed revolutionaries during these years, Stalin gave the majority of the spoils of 
his exploits to the Party. In fact, he and others like Kamo showed little interest in money, and 
lived in poor and wretched conditions. Often, Stalin would be seen in the bitter winter months 
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without a proper coat, and would have to write to fellow comrades to borrow as little as five 
rubles.21 Though from time to time he would spend some of the riches on a wild party, Stalin did 
not hesitate to order the execution of any gangster caught stealing from the Bolsheviks.22  
Given his conduct, Stalin should be considered a dedicated revolutionary, but the same 
cannot be said of the rest of his gang who shared numerous traits with common criminals. The 
fact Stalin is often recorded as articulating the he was a “revolutionary not a criminal,” indicates 
his awareness the public often perceived his actions as common banditry. This is particularly true 
given the exorbitant amount of expropriations occurring in Russia at this time under the name of 
the revolution, which radicals used to personally enrich themselves. When forming his gangs, 
Stalin did not necessarily care about an individual’s dedication to the Party, but first and 
foremost looked for traits distinguished in the underworld. In creating the outfit he called “the 
Mauserists,” Stalin sought after “hotheads” and “cutthroats,” and only when he found these 
individuals did he surround them “with the aura of revolutionary fighters.”23 Accordingly, the 
criminal thus became the revolutionary and often only in name.  
Criminals were often the only ones willing to perform the violent conduct the revolution 
demanded. Stalin understood the importance of these individuals, given he believed victory 
would be achieved through a mass uprising. In July 1905, he called for the creation of armed 
fighting squads in the Party: 
Hence, our committees must at once, forthwith, proceed to arm the people locally, to set 
up special groups to arrange this matter, to organize district groups for the purpose of 
procuring arms, to organize workshops for the manufacture of different kinds of 
explosives, to draw up plans for the seizing of state and private stores of arms and 
arsenals…In addition to increasing stock of arms and organizing their procurement and 
manufacture, it is necessary to devote most serious attention to the task of organizing 
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fighting squads of every kind for the purpose of utilizing the arms that are being 
procured…The armed fighting squads, ready to go out into the streets and take their place 
at the head of the masses of the people at any moment, can easily achieve the object set 
by the Third Congress.24 
 
Stalin argued radical terrorist activity, not politicking, would win the revolution. In a speech in 
1906 he stated: “The victory of the people must be achieved mainly in the street, by street 
fighting and not by the Duma, not by talking in the Duma.”25 In a 1905 call to workers, he 
attempted to rally the masses by asserting: “Not empty phrases, not senseless ‘self-arming,’ but 
real arming and an armed uprising,” this alone can “lead to the defeat of the government.”26 He 
understood Bloody Sunday provided “glaring proof that arms must be countered only by arms,”27 
and “you cannot stand up against bullets with bare hands!”28 Similar to the Maximalists, he 
rejected the SR decree demanding a halt to terrorist activity after the Tsar issued the October 
Manifesto in 1905. He considered it a poor attempt by the autocrat to prevent the oncoming 
socialist revolution which required systemic changes. “Down with the State Duma!” his voice 
resounded in reaction to it.29 This outlook and a characteristic “detached magnetism” attracted 
“amoral, unbounded psychopaths” to rally around his cause.30 Stalin’s childhood friend and 
closest comrade Kamo best represented this type of revolutionary terrorist. 
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Kamo and the New Revolutionary Terrorist 
A notorious radical extremist, and by various accounts psychologically unbalanced with 
sadistic tendencies, Kamo nonetheless was the model fighter Stalin coveted. He began as a 
revolutionary bandit in February 1906, stealing around 7,000 rubles from a bank coach.31 A 
month later, on a busy street in Kutais, he assaulted another bank coach, this time killing the 
driver and wounding the cashier. After this first taste of blood, Kamo’s heroic and daring feats 
became that of legend, garnering the attention and appraisal of both Stalin and Lenin. His 
comrades raised questions of his mental stability, however, due to his indifference to and 
propensity for unprovoked violence and murder. Kamo strategized to cleanse the Bolsheviks of 
potential police informers by staging a fake arrest of leading Party activists, torturing them, and 
killing those who talked or were perceived as cowards.32 “The personality of Kamo presents a 
striking example of an individual whose derangement became a catalyst for violent behavior that 
in the prevailing circumstances of the era happened to take revolutionary form.”33 Outside the 
revolutionary environment, those attracted to this type of brutal conduct would have been 
labelled “criminals” or perhaps “criminally insane.” But radicals like Stalin used these 
individuals by classifying their activities as “revolutionary” and thus justified by the ideology. 
Lenin even recognized Kamo most likely suffered from a psychiatric disorder,34 but this did not 
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stop him from employing the outlaw to do what he did best—steal and murder—making him in 
Lenin’s eyes “a truly amazing person.”35 
Kamo exemplified Anna Geifman’s reference of the “revolutionary of a new type.” This 
sort of character thrived in the atmosphere of the first decade of twentieth-century Russia. He 
personified many of the traits other radicals possessed during this time, setting them apart from 
the revolutionaries of earlier generations.36 Kamo hailed from an impoverished background, like 
so many other of the terrorists, and exploited the opportunity of revolution to escape this 
lifestyle. Stalin also came from poverty; his father was a cobbler. Historians contend their 
respective fathers abused both Stalin and Kamo growing up, which may have influenced their 
psyche and capacity for violence. 37 Expelled from school at the age of 14, Kamo had little 
formal education.38 This was common among revolutionaries in Stalin’s combat units, who 
would have “never been seen with a book” in their hands.39 At the same time, while his peers 
considered Stalin a smart and studious student, the Gori Theological Seminary expelled him 
before he could graduate. Individuals like Kamo also sought adventure and were willing to risk 
their lives in the fervor of the revolution. Moreover, these characteristics made them more prone 
to violence as long as it was recognized or rewarded.  
Stalin’s intellectual capacity and gift for organization helped him rise above the common 
revolutionary terrorist. Lenin revered him for his meticulousness and attention to detail. Clearly, 
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he was no mere common criminal, as he so often stated, but rather a devoted revolutionary. His 
comrades even indicated he was “married to Bolshevism.”40 But at the same time, he surrounded 
himself with those, like Kamo, who were reckless and bloodthirsty and willing to commit 
atrocities for an ideology they did not wholly understand. The revolution meant something 
different to them than to Stalin and Lenin. For the bandits, pirates, and assassins, it provided 
them the opportunity to seek thrills and adventure while being justified to act outside the law. 
Kamo did not use the ideology to steal for his own benefit like countless other revolutionaries, 
but instead took advantage of the occasion because he thrived in the role and received 
recognition and praise for it. Some comrades mentioned members in Kamo’s group “literally 
worshipped” the Bolshevik leaders and “would have followed Lenin even against the entire 
party.”41 They expressed little desire to learn or study theory, but instead craved action. 
Moreover, this was reason for Kamo, a person with little knowledge of rudimentary Marxism, to 
deal with controversy by relying on violence.42 Hence when a Bolshevik and Menshevik were 
debating about an agrarian issue, he pulled the Bolshevik aside, and while pointing at the other, 
said, “What are you arguing with him for? Let me cut his throat.”43 Theory meant little when 
faced with a knife or revolver. 
 
Political Assassination and Mass Murder 
Not only did Stalin oversee expropriations and other forms of banditry, he also planned 
assassinations. In 1905, Stalin worked with the Mensheviks in ordering a hit on General Fyodor 
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Griizanov in Tiflis.44 In another instance, a member of one of his Red Brigade units indicated 
Stalin had commanded them to kill “as many of the Black Hundreds,” as possible.45 While Stalin 
ordered the assassinations of individuals obedient to the state, he also monitored the followers of 
his own Party. He directed the executions of anyone acting outside the will of the Party, whether 
as a police agent or thief of Party funds. Bachua Kupriashvili, a member of “the Outfit,” stated: 
“On the initiative and orders of Stalin…Our tasks were procuring arms, organizing prison 
escapes, holding up banks and arsenals, and killing traitors.”46 On one occasion, Davrichewy, the 
chief of the military wing of the Socialists-Federalists, witnessed Stalin command Kamo to 
murder a revolutionary bandit accused of stealing from the Party.47 While there is little evidence 
to prove Stalin was regularly involved in assassinations, there is enough to show on more than 
one occasion he organized and ordered them. 
Even though there are no recorded instances during this time of Stalin assassinating 
opponents himself, many of those he interacted with on a daily basis, his closest comrades in 
arms, were murderers. He was “always seen in the company of cutthroats, blackmailers, and 
robbers.”48 It was no accident Stalin was involved with these characters. Existing within the 
revolutionary fervor, where political violence could thrive, he viewed these men as the true 
soldiers of the revolution. Stalin existed in this world of killers and their victims. In the ordering 
of assassinations, he had his first taste of blood, even if it not done by his own hand. 
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 Similar to how the Maximalists and Anarchists used ideology to commit indiscriminate 
murder, the formations for this type of thinking were visible in Stalin’s words and actions The 
Maximalists created a dichotomous world pitting one side against another, and used this outlook 
to cleanse society of enemies on a large scale. Likewise, in 1905, Stalin stated: “In our times 
only two ideologies can exist: bourgeois and socialist.49” And also, “Two big armies have 
entered the arena—the army of the proletarians and the army of the bourgeoisie—and the 
struggle between these two armies embraces the whole of our social life.”50 Later in the year, he 
argued these two classes were engaged in a “life-and-death struggle,” the results of which could 
only be a “decisive clash between the two.”51 And “whoever tries to sit between two stools 
betrays the revolution. Those who are not for us are against us!”52 Given this type of rhetoric, 
Stalin viewed the world in a binary lens, similar to the Maximalists, where no room existed for 
neutrality. He categorized the population in groups of loyalists and enemies. These 
classifications set the framework for labelling “enemies of people” in the 1930s and the 
subsequent murder of millions of innocent citizens. 
The pre-revolutionary situation in Russia was ripe with the dehumanization not only of 
victims but perpetrators of crimes as well. In such a chaotic setting, conceptions of morality 
more and more become distorted as the violence increases. 
The rank-and-file, recruited for homicide and dispatched to spill blood for the sake of a 
subversive organization or terrorist state, are conditioned to perceive their victims as 
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inanimate targets of annihilation. Before the terrorist is capable of slaughter, he is 
dehumanized into a mechanism of destruction.53 
 
One has to be habituated to killing before doing so, and the atmosphere of the revolution, along 
with radical ideology, provided the catalyst for this behavior. Individuals became lost in the 
rampant terror and violence obfuscating their vision and notions of normalcy. Supposed 
revolutionaries turned into rabid killing machines.  
Once terrorism increased in scale between 1905-1910, the public started to view this 
activity as more or less commonplace. Seeing violence in the streets and reading about it daily in 
the newspapers, Russians gradually became desensitized. Similarly, the empathy or sympathy of 
the terrorists towards their victims soon disappeared. At first radicals targeted only those pre-
conceived as “enemies,” but as the violence spread, so did the victims which more and more 
included innocent people. As Stalin stated: “What can we do? One can’t pick a rose without 
pricking oneself on a thorn. Leaves fall from the trees in autumn—but fresh ones grow in the 
spring.”54 Given this outlook, individuals radicals injured or killed, even when innocent, were 
not victims of the terrorists, but of the natural progression of the revolution. In this environment, 
“human life was cheapened” and was “not worth a penny.”55 The more an individual experienced 
death, the more their humanity left them, and their capacity for destruction only increased. Stalin 
learned how to kill in these early years of the revolution. He understood the type of environment 
necessary to commit these atrocities. And he performed them knowing his actions were justified 
by the ideology he whole-heartedly believed in. 
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Stalin’s involvement in the pre-revolutionary terrorism during the years 1905-1908 
significantly impacted his development as a revolutionary. During this time, he began to directly 
experience the extent ideology could be used to commit murder and other atrocities. It is little 
wonder then for Stalin as “one of the first professional revolutionaries, the underground was his 
natural habitat.”56 In some ways, even after consolidating power as the supreme leader of the 
Soviet Union, Stalin never left the criminal underground. The gangsters surrounding him as a 
Red Brigade leader resembled those forming his inner circle once in power, ruthlessly obeying 
and carrying out his orders of terror. Individuals like Stalin thrive in an environment desensitized 
to violence where ideology trumps morality. This is where he underwent his true revolutionary 
education. And this is where he initially developed the capacity to murder millions of innocent 
people in the name of socialism. 
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CHAPTER IV: THE TERROR OF THE 1930s 
 During a summer day in 1923, Stalin, the Old Bolshevik Lev Kamenev, and the director 
of the secret police Felix Dzerzhinsky, amicably conversed over a bottle of wine. By then, the 
bulk of the fighting during the Russian Civil War had already ceased, and the Bolsheviks 
succeeded in securing power under the guidance and directive of Lenin and the war hero 
Trotsky. The men, speaking freely, discussed things they enjoyed most in life, and once it came 
to Stalin’s turn he said: “The greatest delight is to mark one’s enemy, prepare everything, avenge 
oneself thoroughly, and then go to sleep.”1 Whether Stalin spoke these words in honesty or to 
cause a stir is more or less irrelevant. As uncontested leader of the Soviet Union he pursued this 
course over and over again. Trotsky, after recording this instance in his diary once Kamenev 
related the story to him, became one of the countless victims of Stalin’s terror. Unlike the 
millions of others who perished in labor camps, the extreme conditions of prisons, shot by firing 
squads, or under torture in an investigation chamber, Trotsky met his demise in Mexico from the 
ice pick of a Soviet agent stabbing him in the head. Stalin’s confession, if it can be called such, 
came to be known amongst the Party as his “theory of sweet revenge.”2  
There are two schools of thought regarding the state terror of the Stalin regime: the 
totalitarian and revisionist models. The totalitarian paradigm, supported by scholars such as 
Robert Conquest, Roy Medvedev, Hannah Arendt, and Oleg Khlevniuk, contends Stalin 
implemented and oversaw the terror throughout all phases.3 On the other hand, revisionist 
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scholars4 such as J. Arch Getty, Sheila Fitzpatrick, and Roberta Manning argue the repression, 
while implemented from above, was also influenced and directed from below.5 According to the 
latter school, local officials had more control over the situation than mere servants, and Stalin did 
not intend to launch a “campaign-style operation” in the late 1930s, forcing him to reign in the 
terror from its excesses.6 Also, revisionist scholars attempt to include social and cultural values 
and bring agency into the picture for the victims they claim under the totalitarian model are more 
or less “atomized” and “passive” members controlled by the regime.7 Regardless of these 
differences, both schools agree Stalin was the key player in this arena of death and despair. 
My intention in this chapter is not to claim I have the answers to the ongoing debate 
between the revisionist and totalitarian schools of thought. Nor do I propose to present subjects 
as passive victims during the terror. My objective, rather, is to show the ways Stalin and his 
henchmen manipulated ideology during this time period to commit violence, and highlight 
similarities which can be traced back to his revolutionary experiences between 1905 and 1908. 
Also, I argue Stalin employed ideology to dehumanize victims, similar to how the Maximalists 
and Anarchists did so in pre-revolutionary Russian society. In doing so, he organized and 
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encouraged indiscriminate murder on a massive scale unheard of in the modern era. Whether 
local officials, the ruling elites, or Stalin’s henchmen committed the violence, they conducted 
and justified it based on an ideological platform. Stalin, as leader of the Party, represented this 
ideology. Therefore, even when wielded as a tool, the terror of the 1930s placed Stalinism front 
and center. 
 
Historical Determinism to Consolidate Power 
Once in power, Stalin oversaw an amorphous terror reaching every crevice of his empire. 
The terror shadowed Stalin’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism and its deterministic outlook 
on the flow of history and nature. He played the role of the facilitator of the ideology. Because it 
followed the laws of history, which supposedly were leading to an ideal communist state, then 
the best way to achieve that goal was to rid the world of anything obstructing its path.8 This 
meant any individual in support of capitalism or fascism, appearing as a member of a class other 
than the “proletariat,” an ambiguous term in itself, or standing in the way of societal 
development, needed to be removed as a hindrance to progress. Thus, Stalin brandished terror as 
an effective tool of the ideology by masking it in the language of Marxims-Leninism.  
Since the Party was always right, given they were acting in accordance with historical 
laws, the Bolsheviks could manipulate ideology to commit any atrocity. Stalin seized this 
opportunity to obtain complete control over the Soviet Union. As Nikolai Bukharin correctly 
predicted, Stalin’s objectives resulted in the creation of a police state. He concluded “nothing 
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will stop Stalin” in pushing forward his version of socialism.9 As facilitator of the ideology, 
Stalin justified any action he committed as right, because he and his inner circle alone 
understood the laws of historical development. Since every decision he made was part of an 
already determined process, his opponents said “he changes his theories according to the need he 
has of getting rid of somebody at such-and-such moment.”10 Even if his decisions directly 
contradicted the writings of Marx or Lenin, Stalin still justified it within his ideology. And, since 
he had mastered the texts of Lenin, he commanded any quote he wished, even if taken out of 
context, to support his actions.  
It has been more or less agreed upon by scholars that Stalin’s personal drive for power 
formed the nature of the purges and the terror. This perspective does not indicate he and other 
leaders did not whole heartedly believe in Marxism-Leninism. In fact, it was quite the opposite; 
Marxism was “a key source of his power,”11 and his comrades indicated “he was married to 
Bolshevism.”12 Throughout his whole life, Stalin held a “tenacious dedication to the 
revolutionary cause.”13 As a bandit in 1905-1908, he did not extort millions of rubles for his own 
wealth and betterment like numerous other of the supposed revolutionaries.14 Almost all of the 
money went to the Party, leaving the future leader with torn second-hand clothing, scrapping for 
his meals.15 After Lenin’s death, Stalin believed he alone could bring forth Lenin’s vision. 
Whereas Trotsky, Stalin’s biggest rival for power, attempted to be seen as Lenin’s equal, Stalin 
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sold himself to the Russian population as Lenin’s pupil.16 For him to achieve his goals, however, 
he needed to rid the country of unbelievers and any possible threats to the state. As threats 
changed throughout the 1930s, so did the classifications of enemies needing to be eliminated. 
This list included anyone potentially willing to challenge Stalin’s supreme power. In this light, 
he used the terror, blanketed in ideological phrasing of “class enemies” and “enemies of the 
people,” both for the attainment of personal power and to continue the revolution, for without 
Stalin, the revolution, at least in his mind, would have failed. 
Stalin’s use of ideology to commit mass murder was not a new experience for him. In the 
tumultuous period of 1905-1908, while in charge of the Red Brigade units, the terrorists from 
different revolutionary parties often intermingled and worked together. In fact, of the Social 
Democrats, the Bolsheviks contributed most to the terrorism of non-SD parties.17 The bombs the 
Maximalists used on their assault of Pyotr Stolypin, which killed dozens of innocent people, 
were created in a Bolshevik laboratory.18 Similarly, they were involved in various exploits of the 
Anarchists, particularly in the border areas where Stalin operated.19 While further research may 
establish or deny connections between Stalin and the Maximalists or Anarchists, it can be 
assumed even if they did not directly interact with one another, Stalin was aware of their actions 
and theories. And for a man repetitively calling for “real arming and an armed uprising” and “not 
empty phrases”20 or politicking, the direct action taken by the Maximalists and Anarchists would 
have only been appealing. At the same time, their attempts to dehumanize victims using 
ideologically coded language of purification to conduct indiscriminate murder may also have 
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influenced a young Stalin. By the late 1920s, in his own words Stalin called for the “liquidation” 
and “smashing” of “exploiting classes.” Once the revolution succeeded, he concluded “the gates” 
to the new society would be “opened only to those who are worthy.”21 Similarly, the Maximalist 
theoretician Ivan Pavlov believed “the purifying force of violence would eliminate all the guilty, 
like cockroaches, inaugurating a new world of magnanimous and selfless innocence.”22 These 
ideas of a prominent Maximalist theoretician could have come out of Stalin’s mouth as long as it 
fit within Marxism-Leninism, meaning the guilty were “class enemies” or “enemies of the 
people,” and the new world was communist. 
 
Constructing and Labelling Enemies 
As scholars of totalitarianism have noted, historically these movements have had to 
continually construct enemies in order to survive and grow.23 For if there were no enemies, the 
movement would cease to exist. In the Russian scenario this means all classes would be 
destroyed, the dictatorship of the proletariat no longer needed, and communism achieved. Since 
communism never fully developed, however, Stalin had to continually find new enemies to fight, 
otherwise his ideology could not be legitimized.24 The Bolsheviks used “Trotskyist” as a main 
classification of enemies throughout the 1930s. At the same time, they changed the definition of 
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a “Trotskyist” during the different peaks of the terror, and the majority of those persecuted for 
Trotskyism had no connection or allegiance to him whatsoever.25 The leading Bolsheviks could 
label anyone opposed to Stalin and the revolution a Trotskyist. “Had there been no Trotsky, 
Stalin would have had to invent him. Or more precisely, Stalin invented the Trotsky he 
needed.”26 In a speech in 1929, Stalin stated: “The subversive activities of the Trotskyist 
organization demand that the Soviet authorities wage an implacable fight against this anti-Soviet 
organization.”27 Indeed, they did just that; the Bolsheviks hunted and executed countless 
innocent people they labelled “Trotskyists.” 
Since opponents always exist and are actively scheming in a totalitarian state, the rulers 
respond by segregating the population into groups in support of the regime and groups in support 
of the enemy. Hannah Arendt described how in this scenario “the world is divided into two 
gigantic hostile camps, one of which is the movement, and that the movement can and must fight 
the whole world—a claim which prepares the way for indiscriminate aggressiveness of 
totalitarian regimes in power.”28 Anyone not in support of the Bolsheviks inherently was against 
the revolution, socialism, and the advancement of society—an enemy of the people. The 
Maximalists and Anarchists, while fighting for the revolution in the first decade of the twentieth 
century, held a similar view of the population. The Maximalists constructed a “radically bipartite 
world with no space for neutrality.”29 This is part of the reason why the Anarchists, even though 
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they numbered fewer than the other revolutionary groups, were responsible for the most murders 
in the time period.30 
After the Bolsheviks divided the world into two competing camps, indiscriminate 
violence flourished in Russia in the 1930s. Similarly, this also occurred in the first decade of the 
twentieth century; revolutionaries threw bombs into trains, theatres, and dining halls simply 
because they presumed these places were frequented by the bourgeoisie.31 If they murdered an 
innocent person, which occurred frequently with such careless use of weaponry, they justified it 
in the name of the revolution. In this environment, victims became tallies on a revolutionary’s 
kill list.32 In the 1930s, while rounding up either kulaks or those considered enemies of the 
people, local officials had to meet given quotas. In one example, a Politburo resolution passed in 
January 1930 designated how many thousands of “oriental” individuals in each region must be 
sent to concentration camps or deported. The resolution also indicated three to five percent of all 
kulak farms must be liquidated per province.33 Resolutions such as these continued to be passed 
throughout the terror of the 1930s. This dehumanization and arbitrary arrest meant an individual 
was no longer a human, but rather a number.  
Stalin himself verified the lists of deported and murdered Soviet citizens. On November 
12, 1938, Stalin and Molotov signed off on 3,167 executions admitting around “one or two out of 
ten were wrongly caught” and thus were innocent.34 They rationalized the murders of guiltless 
civilians as being part of the larger cause. In one instance in July 1938, Nikolai Yezhov, then 
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head of the NKVD, sent Stalin a list of 138 names he requested to execute. Both Stalin and 
Molotov signed their death sentences, “Shoot all 138.” Each one of those names indicated a 
member of the Party in a directorial position, constituting the “largest massacre of the leadership 
in the whole period.”35 This arbitrary violence stifled any outcry or response from individuals 
constantly worried if or when their time would come. In appearance, the logic behind the 
ideology makes little sense at this time. The populations they murdered, after all, were “the 
people” socialism should have benefitted most. The terror, thus, must be looked at as a tool of 
totalitarian control. Even though Stalin cloaked the violence in ideological phrasing, he wielded 
the terror as an instrument of dominance over the individual.  
Throughout the 1930s, the Bolsheviks continued to alter their definitions and 
classifications of enemies. At first, they targeted “class enemies.” This category originated from 
the Marxist view that in order to achieve communism a classless society first needed to be 
created. Therefore, the idea of a “class enemy” was ideological in itself. The term “class” more 
or less “turned out to be an ambiguous category,” since the revolution provided a platform for 
biographical reinvention.36 At the same time, the state also targeted others, such as the peasants 
during collectivization and forced grain requisition. Peasants certainly were not part of the 
bourgeoisie, but their persecution fit Stalin’s model of central planning. Many of those classified 
as “enemies of the people” were victims of the First Five Year Plan. They fled collectivization 
and moved to the cities, forcing Stalin to implement new methods to eradicate them. Other 
“enemies of the people,” whether criminals, intellectuals, or those with different ideological 
leanings, the Bolsheviks rounded-up and murdered or deported. As the move towards 
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industrialization during the First Five Year Plan did not progress according to plan, the 
Bolsheviks perceived enemies called “wreckers” were the ones ruining the economy. 
Approaching World War II, the state began targeting individuals from “enemy nations.” This 
included anyone of a different ethnicity, who they assumed was willing to help a foreign power 
attack the Soviet Union.37 
An “enemy of the people” could be a spy, traitor, wrecker, kulak, criminal, fascist, 
capitalist, a member of the bourgeoisie, intellectual, Trotskyist, foreigner, or 
counterrevolutionary. The Bolsheviks used these terms interchangeably and forced these 
ambiguous categorizations on people. Anyone could be an enemy, even the most outspoken and 
ardent supporter. “Simply because of their capacity to think, human beings are suspects by 
definition, and this suspicion cannot be diverted by exemplary behavior, for the human capacity 
to think is also a capacity to change one’s mind.”38 Numerous individuals were “killed not 
because of what they had done but because of what they might do.”39 In order to coerce absolute 
subservience to the totalitarian state, the state must enforce control over the arbitrary individual; 
this was the effect of the terror. In order to implement the vast directional changes in society, and 
to stay in power, Stalin needed a population which either expressed loyalty to the regime or 
remained silent out of fear.  
Nikolai Bukharin correctly predicted Stalinism would lead to a police state. In order to 
progress, Stalin expanded the state apparatus and secret police to enforce his ideology upon an 
often unwilling population. For instance, the peasants raised a massive outcry against the 
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implementation of the First Five Year Plan. Because of their unrest, the Bolsheviks forcefully 
imposed the plan upon the peasantry through state control and police brutality. At first, the 
policies were unsuccessful, causing massive grain shortages and weakened production and 
quality of goods nearly resulting in bankruptcy. By 1932, peasants led strikes and rioted around 
the country in response to the socio-economic crisis.40 Per Boris Nicolaevsky, the circumstances 
were so dire “the predominant view in Party circles” was “the situation could be saved only by 
his [Stalin’s] removal from Party domination.”41 Martemyan Riutin, a non-voting member of the 
Central Committee, wrote a critique of Stalin, fifty pages of which he dedicated to an attack on 
Stalin’s personal characteristics. In response, the police arrested Riutin, and for the first time the 
leadership discussed the death penalty for an oppositionist stance among prominent Bolsheviks.42 
While they dismissed execution as an option for the time being, the ongoing situation called for 
extreme measures. Since Stalin’s policies “could not enjoy a victory grounded in positive 
outcomes,” they “therefore had to be based primarily on force and terror.”43 The worse the 
situation became, the more the government responded with repressive measures.44 While a 
crackdown ensued, it is important to note Stalin cloaked the terror resulting from these 
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circumstances in ideological language. As such, the NKVD undertook an operation to rid the 
country of “class enemies” and “enemies of the people.” 
 
The First Five Year Plan 
The First Five Year Plan called for the complete collectivization of the peasantry within a 
year. Stalin initiated this portion of the plan in January 1930, and in the first five months, over 
half of the agrarian population had been collectivized.45 The peasantry responded with hostility, 
arming themselves against local Party workers and destroying their livestock in protest. It is 
estimated during the First Five Year Plan, peasants slaughtered 26.6 million cattle and killed 
15.3 million horses in protest to the policy.46 They viewed the First Five Year Plan as a reversal 
of the New Economic Policy (NEP) implemented after the Civil War. The NEP provided 
individual enterprise and prevented forced grain requisition in order to grow an economy 
devastated by war. At the same time, it made the peasantry more inclined to socialism. 
Collectivization, on the other hand, ended individual ownership and required the collective farms 
to hand over designated amounts of grain to the state. In January 1930, officials recorded over 
400 riots in the countryside. By February it reached 1,066 and in March 6,512. This amount is 
significant especially compared with a combined 63 riots recorded in 1926 and 1927.47 In 
reaction to the peasant outcry, Stalin did not abandon the First Five Year Plan, but rather slightly 
adapted it making the process more gradual. Concurrently, he responded with repressive 
                                                          
45 Conquest, The Great Terror, 18. 
46 Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, 47. 
47 Khlevniuk, Master of the House, 8. 
82 
measures to silence the peasant uproar.48 By 1932, the state had collectivized the majority of all 
farms in the country.49 
Stalin had two primary goals in mind regarding the collectivization of the peasantry. The 
first was to expand production, which the Bolsheviks achieved thanks primarily to technological 
advances. The second, and more important objective, was to simply crush the peasantry at any 
cost.50 Stalin wanted it widely known that central planning, a core method of Stalinism, was here 
to stay no matter the countless lives lost in the process. “The GPU and the 180,000 Party workers 
sent from cities used the gun, the lynch mob and the Gulag camp system to break the villages.”51 
A major issue with the forced requisition of grain was the state demanded far too high of quotas. 
Even in a good year it was difficult for the collectives to produce enough. Nonetheless, if the 
peasants did not meet the quotas, the local police took whatever they had on hand, and left the 
collective to starve. “The main methods of grain collected were house-to-house searches, mass 
arrests, shootings, and deportations…The OGPU “cleansed” industrial enterprises of 
‘disruptors,’ ‘kulaks,’ and ‘wreckers.’”52 A significant problem arrived in 1932 and 1933, once 
the North Caucuses and the Ukraine experienced a famine. Under these circumstances, the 
collectives could not conceivably achieve the level of grain demanded. Even so, on July 14, 
1933, Stalin issued an order to shoot “hungry peasants who stole even husks of grain.”53 
Officials ransacked peasant homes, stealing rubles and any items they could get their hands on, 
including insignificant things such as handkerchiefs. After this humiliation, they evicted the 
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peasants from their houses.54 It is estimated through the years 1930 and 1933 anywhere between 
four and ten million peasants died because of the First Five Year Plan and the famine.55 
The same time Stalin announced the First Five Year Plan, the regime also broadcasted the 
liquidation of the kulaks as official policy.56 In January 1930, Molotov divided kulaks into three 
categories: the first included those to be immediately eliminated, the second were to be 
imprisoned in camps, and the third deported. The Bolsheviks placed between five and seven 
million individuals in one of these three categories.57 In the year 1930 alone, the NKVD and 
police deported over 550,000 kulaks from their homes.58 In order to meet their industrialization 
targets, many of the “dekulakized” peasants arrived to work at industrial cities under harsh 
conditions. Stephen Kotkin presented how one of these cities came to fruition in his remarkable 
work Magnetic Mountain.59 In response to the rebellious peasants who killed livestock, the 
government issued a decree claiming the homes of those partaking in these activities would be 
confiscated and the individuals exiled or sent to a camp.60 The state and police liquidated up to 
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three million households during this time.61 As one Bolshevik saw it: “Corpses—corpses in 
ragged sheepskin coats and cheap felt boots; corpses in peasant huts; in the melting snow of the 
Old Volgoda, under the bridge of Kharkov.”62 
The Bolsheviks destroyed the kulaks in the name of Marxism-Leninism. Given the end 
goal of communism was a classless society, the kulaks were a hindrance since they represented 
the wealthy peasants owning large tracts of land and animals. Even so, the term “kulak” was 
used ambiguously, meaning “anyone who resisted” collectivization, no matter their status as a 
peasant, became a “kulak enemy.”63 Stalin himself even scribbled in his notes: “What does kulak 
mean?”64 Regardless, he employed the language of Marxism to implement a program to 
“liquidate” the kulaks through the use of terror. In a similar manner, the Maximalists and 
Anarchists called for the liquidation of the bourgeoisie and any remnants of tsarism in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. The Anarchists “attacked anyone who represented the 
oppressive economic order, namely factory owners and directors, managers, merchants, land and 
store owners, and all of the exploiters.”65 While they did not have the state bureaucracy to 
implement the level of terror Stalin had, they used individual acts of terrorism to bring about this 
change. 
The other major aspect of the First Five Year Plan was the rapid improvement of the 
industrial sector. The majority of resources in the Soviet Union during these years went towards 
the goal of catching and exceeding the capitalist countries in heavy industrial output. The state 
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incentivized production and handed out awards to those exceeding their quotas. This led to the 
Stakhanovite movement during the Second Five Year Plan, when workers did everything they 
could to break records of production. To do so included a reorganization of labor to promote the 
individual at the expense of overall production, meaning it deprived raw materials to some other 
sector of industry. This resulted in a massive dislocation of materials. At the same time, few 
skilled engineers lived in Russia—a backwards country which confronted intellectuals. This led 
to faulty construction of plants and machinery, breaking down for months on end to be repaired. 
Because of these factors, the quotas directors had to meet, or even exceed, were so unrealistic 
managers increasingly falsified their production numbers to out of control proportions. As a 
result of all of this, the cost of production went way up, the quality of goods down, and the 
government verged on financial collapse.66 
The impossible goals established by the Bolshevik leadership and forced upon the Soviet 
people caused the economy to plummet, triggering protests and unrest. In April 1932, laborers 
across mills in the Ivanono-Vaoznesensk region went on strike. A few days later, riots spread 
throughout the area. To prevent further agitation, the police rounded up strike leaders in a 
decision to “eliminate anti-Soviet” elements.67 Because the Bolsheviks perceived Stalinism to be 
“scientifically correct,” they concluded “all industrial mistakes must be the result of sabotage by 
the workers.”68 The state blamed managers for the lack of production and accused them of 
“wrecking.” And because Stakhanovism was supported by Stalin, there was little they could do 
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to combat its inefficiencies.69 In the year 1930, the NKVD and police arrested more than 330,000 
individuals in industry, 208,000 of which were convicted, and of those the state executed 
approximately 20,000 by firing squad.70 
The Stalin regime feared the idea of subversive elements, particularly in the industrial 
sector, and believed foreign capitalists or remnants of the bourgeois class were actively plotting 
to overthrow the Soviet Union. While Marx harkened it was the duty of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat to fight these counterrevolutionary forces, the extent of terror the Bolsheviks 
unleashed went way beyond the protection of the revolution. In the Shakhty Trial of 1928, the 
state had arrested and charged a group of engineers for conspiring with members of the 
bourgeois class in order to sabotage the Soviet economy. As Stalin stated in a report to the 
Moscow CPSU: “The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic counter-revolution, 
plotted by a section of the bourgeois experts, former coal-owners... [It] marks another serious 
attack on the Soviet regime launched by international capital and its agents in our country.”71 
According to Stalin, the only response to the Shakhty affair was to “strengthen the revolution and 
meet our enemies fully prepared.”72 Moreover, strengthening the revolution meant an increased 
use of terror to coerce conformity to the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, or keep society 
subservient to the state out of fear. 
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In order for the Soviet Union to undergo such a massive industrial transformation, the 
workers had to submit to the ideology of the regime. For those unwilling, the Bolsheviks 
installed forcible and violent measures. Starting in 1930, the state restricted the free movement of 
labor, and to change locations or jobs, workers needed to receive permission from their current 
employer. Similarly, in 1932, the Bolsheviks revoked a law protecting workers from forced 
relocation without their consent as new industrial sites were constructed and needed labor. Later 
that year, the state introduced a passport requirement among the urban populations. At the same 
time, they sent secret details to Party officials instructing them to deny passports to those not 
engaged in “socially useful work,” to kulaks or peasants who fled the farm collectives, and to 
anyone dismissed from work for any reason as well as the members of their respective families.73 
To be denied a passport essentially prevented these individuals from living in Soviet towns. 
Consequently, the state banished countless of these classified “enemies” and punished others 
with labor camp sentences. 
The famine of 1932-1933 created cadres of impoverished and starving beggars and 
vagrants moving to the major cities, becoming criminals just to survive. In reaction to the 
perceived degradation of cities, the regime ordered police sweeps across major urban centers 
targeting “socially harmful elements.” In April 1933, they arrested over 6,000 of these 
individuals in Moscow and Leningrad deporting them to Tomsk. Without food or tools to work, 
4,000 died of hunger and exhaustion within weeks.74 Similar raids continued throughout the 
1930s, targeting any individuals classified as dangerous.  
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The Great Terror and the Moscow Trials 
Between 1935 and 1939, the regime instituted purges that the police and NKVD carried 
out in almost every facet of state and society: The Party, the Army, the NKVD, former kulaks, 
different ethnic groups, and the Foreign Services, to name a handful.75 These purges consist of 
what has come to be known as the Great Terror. According to Stalinist propaganda, the regime 
only targeted “enemies,” and as such “honest citizens had nothing to fear.”76 In the end, 
however, the victims mostly included innocent citizens supposedly part of a “fifth column” 
preparing to attack the Soviet Union in case of war.77 Accordingly, the regime focused their 
attention on anyone perceived to have an association with a foreign entity. Police conducted 
arrests often based simply on an individual’s ethnicity. In March 1937, the NKVD issued an 
order which mandated the creation of a registry for foreigners who had received Soviet 
citizenship after January 1, 1936.78 They then used this registry to draw up lists of those to 
incarcerate, exile, or eliminate.   
Scholars often argue Stalin, Nikolai Yezhov, and other leaders of the NKVD sincerely 
believed the Soviet Union was under threat of attack during this time by a “fifth column” of 
spies, traitors, and Trotskyites.79At the same time, historians have noted the “most important” 
function of the terror was “ensuring that society was kept in a state of submissiveness, 
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suppressing dissent and opposition, and solidifying the sole authority of the leader.”80 Both of 
these outlooks fit together when viewing Stalin’s terror in context of the ideology. The NKVD 
began the purge of the Party by generating lists of names of Party members in administrative 
roles. One of the lists had two columns: those already expelled from the Party and those who 
“wavered” from their roles yet still held jobs. The police soon arrested and shot the majority of 
both columns.81 In July 1937, the Politburo resolution entitled “On Anti-Soviet Elements,” 
required local authorities to register criminal offenders and kulaks fleeing exile. From this 
registry, Party leaders determined the numbers to be killed and sent to labor camps.82  
Later in the same month, the Bolsheviks issued Order no. 00447, which expanded the 
targets to include anyone committing the “slightest resistance to Soviet authority.”83 This 
resolution added former non-Bolshevik Party members, former members of the White Guard, 
surviving tsarist officials, spies and terrorists, political prisoners, and others who fit this 
classification, to the registry to be purged.84 The regime then divided the list into two categories: 
those to be arrested and immediately executed, and those to be sent to camp or prison for eight to 
ten years. The state provided local officials in each region with quotas to fulfill for each 
category. Shortly after receiving these quotas, most officials requested higher targets later 
authorized by Moscow.85 After the NKVD arrested an individual, they next interrogated and 
tortured the perceived enemy to obtain evidence. This evidence led to new arrestees put through 
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the same steps. In total, NKVD statistics reveal they arrested 1,575,259 people between 1937 and 
1938, and of the 1,344,923 convicted, they sentenced 681,692 to be shot.86 As stated in a 
Politburo resolution: “Purification of the country from rebel sabotage and espionage cadres 
played a positive role in ensuring the continued success of socialist construction.”87 
While it is clear the Bolsheviks used ideology to terrorize the population in order to 
secure the revolution and Stalin’s role as Party leader, another primary function was to remove 
Old Bolsheviks from positions of power. This type of purge had its difficulties given the accused 
enemies were clearly not traitors of the regime. Therefore, Stalin and Yezhov manufactured 
crimes and forced the Old Bolsheviks to confess to them. The Moscow Trials represent the most 
distinct use of ideology to remove any opposition to Stalin and clear his path as totalitarian 
leader. 
Before Stalin could obtain complete directional control over the Soviet Union, he first 
needed to emancipate himself from any potential Party regulation. He also understood long time 
Bolsheviks, even if they pledged their loyalty to him, remembered the policy failures he had 
implemented in the First Five Year Plan as well as Lenin’s “testament” about his removal.88 
Therefore, he wanted to eliminate the old guard and replace it with a younger generation 
unquestionably loyal to the dictator. To do so at the top level in the Politburo and the Central 
Committee, he built up cases against Old Bolsheviks, including anyone with the potential to 
contest his power or question his outlook, and forced them to confess to made-up crimes in 
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public show trials. The Moscow Trials consisted of three separate hearings: The Zinoviev-
Kamenev Trial in 1936, the Pyatakov-Radek Trial in 1937, and the Bukharin-Rykov Trial in 
1938. Using the courts, Stalin not only crushed the opposition, but also through the process 
understood the extent the terror could be wielded. At first, since these Old Bolsheviks were 
popularly supported among the leadership, Stalin resorted to using public trials to prove the guilt 
of the accused. But by the end, he comprehended he could murder anyone at will without 
needing justification.89  
Despite being informed his or her life would be spared once they issued a confession, 
Stalin ordered the execution of almost everyone in the trials charged with a crime. Before he 
could get away with the obvious murder of close comrades, he first had to test the political 
environment and the Party’s willingness to kill one of their own. The opportunity presented 
itself, or perhaps more appropriately was fashioned by Stalin, with the assassination of Sergei 
Kirov. Immediately following his death, the regime issued an emergency law permitting trials of 
accused terrorists to occur within ten days of arrest, and a sentence of execution could now 
transpire without an appeal.90 As a direct result of this law, in a three-year period the regime 
sentenced approximately two million individuals to death or labor camps.91 In the month of 
Kirov’s murder alone, the NKVD shot a recorded 6,501 individuals.92   
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Leonid Nikolayev murdered Kirov just outside his office on December 1, 1934. An early 
supporter of Stalin and head of the Leningrad Party, Kirov’s murder, according to Robert 
Conquest, “has every right to be called the crime of the century.” He stated: 
Over the next four years, hundreds of Soviet citizens, including the most prominent 
political leaders of the Revolution, were shot for direct responsibility for the 
assassination, and literally millions of others went to their deaths for complicity in one or 
another part of the vast conspiracy which allegedly lay behind it. Kirov’s death, in fact, 
was the keystone of the entire edifice of terror and suffering by which Stalin secured his 
grip on the Soviet peoples.93  
 
Without direct supporting evidence, Conquest contended Stalin himself, with the help of NKVD 
chief Genrikh Yagoda, hatched the plot to kill Kirov.94 There were reasons for Stalin to do so, 
including Kirov’s ascension and popularity. Also, he began to take a much more conciliatory 
approach to Party members, causing Stalin to fear a possible alliance with the Rightists which 
could challenge his authority.95 To kill Kirov then “would remove the immediate obstacle, and at 
the same time create an atmosphere of violence in which the enemies on to whom he [Stalin] 
shifted blame for the murder could be wiped out.” Thus, according to Conquest, at this point 
Stalin “shows more clearly than anything else the completeness of his lack of moral or other 
inhibitions.”96 It fits then that Stalin chose the Old Bolsheviks Grigory Zinoviev and Lev 
Kamenev to be the first arrested and tried for ordering Kirov’s assassination. When Lenin was 
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alive, both were in his immediate trusted circle of leaders. After his death, however, they joined 
the Leftist opposition in the 1920s crushed by Stalin during the battle of Lenin’s succession.  
In 1936, the Party brought Zinoviev, Kamenev and fourteen others to the trial for the 
assassination of Kirov. The prosecutors also charged them with other crimes such as forming a 
terrorist organization intending to murder Stalin, and attempting to overthrow the Soviet 
government. 97 In doing so, the prosecutors alleged the defendants proposed to transition the 
Soviet Union to a Trotskyist course. During interrogations prior to the trial, Zinoviev and 
Kamenev denied any involvement with Trotsky. Only after sleepless nights with the heat cranked 
up in their cells, and fearing for the lives of family members after repeated threats made by their 
captors, did the Old Bolsheviks decided to confess.98 They agreed to do so after receiving 
guarantees from Stalin neither they nor their families would be executed. In 1935, the state 
extended the death penalty to children the age of 12 years; this lawful revision meant Stalin 
could “legally” threaten opponents with the murder of their children.99 After the Old Bolsheviks 
kept their word and confessed to crimes they did not commit, Stalin went back on his; the court 
sentenced all defendants to death and the NKVD subsequently shot them in prison. 
 During the trial of Georgy Pyatakov and Karl Radek in 1937, the Party made similar 
accusations against the defendants including “Trotskyism” and attempted “sabotage.”100 While 
again, these accusations were implausible, Stalin coerced confessions. This time, he approached 
Radek with the offer to spare his life if he confessed to a history of Trotskyism and its influence 
throughout a variety of political sects in Russia. As a result, not only did he accuse himself, 
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Pyatakov and their followers, he also included Zinoviev as well as a “third group” of Trotskyists. 
“Establishing “Trotskyism” of the second and third rank Stalinists in the entourage of men he 
wished to remove, Stalin was setting up precedents which, as resistance weakened, gave him a 
freer and freer hand to deal with more important men with perfect records.”101 With the 
accusation of a “third group” of Trotskyists Stalin intended to denounce Nikolai Bukharin and 
the Rightists. At the same time, during his testimony, Radek openly insinuated Trotskyism had 
spread and infiltrated all aspects of society, and thousands of regular people helped their 
organization and sympathized with their cause.102 In essence, this allegation established 
precedence for a massive purge of the entire population. 
 Radek’s accusation of a “third group” of Trotskyists helped enable Stalin to defeat the 
rest of his opposition and ensure his position of absolute power. It is important to understand up 
until the conclusion of the Moscow Trials, Stalin’s decisions could be and often were contested 
by other members of the Party.103 He could not just remove those he disliked from positions of 
power, and having them killed was out of the question. The Old Bolsheviks held influence and 
were popular in the Party, and Stalin had to respect this or face even greater opposition. “Stalin 
realized that the Politburo could easily unite to dismiss him” and he “knew he could be outvoted, 
even overthrown.”104 This political vulnerability is why Stalin allowed Zinoviev to live in 1927 
after his expulsion from the Party. Similarly, after Bukharin challenged Stalin and his authority 
in 1929, Stalin limited his response to removing Bukharin and other Rightists from the Politburo 
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and nothing more. Their reputations as Bolsheviks were impeccable, and most considered 
Bukharin the main theoretician of the Party. Their popularity and political influence is why the 
Kirov assassination and the subsequent confessions from long standing Bolsheviks were so 
important to Stalin. It provided the context to remove and purge those who he would have been 
unable to years prior. “In the autumn of 1936, Stalin had had to argue and exert pressure to 
secure the arrest and trial even of potential rivals. After the conclusion of the trials he could order 
the arrest of his closest colleagues without consulting anyone. He could strike when and where 
he liked, without appeal.”105 After the Pyatakov-Radek Trial, Stalin reached the point where his 
“despotism became an absolute autocracy.”106 He completed the removal of the Old Bolsheviks 
from the Party, and over the next few years, arrested and executed no fewer than 70 percent of 
the Central Committee.107 
 The Bukharin-Rykov Trial in 1938 comprised of the most prominent and last remaining 
oppositional Old Bolsheviks in power. Included were former members of the Politburo—
Bukharin, Rykov, and Nikolay Krestinsky—as well as the former head of the secret police, 
Genrikh Yagoda. “By physically destroying some members of the Politburo, promoting a new 
generation of functionaries in their place, and persecuting the close associates and relatives of his 
comrades-in-arms, Stalin achieved the total subjugation of the Politburo.”108 While Bukharin 
offered some resistance during the trial by refusing to confess to charges of terrorism and 
espionage, he nonetheless still admitted guilt to other crimes. The prosecutor accused the 
defendants of failed assassination attempts on the life of Lenin and Stalin, the murder of the 
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famous Soviet writer Maxim Gorky, and plotting to overthrow the Soviet Union.109 After the 
court sentenced the defendants and the NKVD carried out their executions, Stalin no longer 
needed public show trials to commit his purges. From here on out, he murdered at will.  
 Out of the conclusion of the Moscow Trials, the question arises as to why so many stout 
Bolsheviks confessed to crimes they did not commit. One important aspect was the frequent use 
of torture. A coded telegram circulated throughout the NKVD in 1939 indicated from the year 
1937 onward, “physical pressure” was to be used on “known and obstinate enemies of the 
people.”110 During trial, if a testifying defendant reneged on a signed confession, when seen 
again a few days later his body often would look battered and swollen, his speech reserved, and 
more often than not he would confess openly to the charges against him. Bukharin commented 
during his trial, Pyatakov looked like “a skeleton with his teeth knocked out.”111 The NKVD 
used torture to get arrestees to confess to the guilt of other associates. The beatings would stop 
only when the interrogator received enough names.112 If torture did not work to garner 
admissions of guilt, interrogators told defendants unless they confessed, their families and 
friends would be rounded up and thrown into the gulags. No matter if they confessed or not, once 
the NKVD arrested a member of the Party, there was little doubt sooner or later they would come 
for his or her family. On July 5, 1937, a Politburo resolution ordered the confinement of “all 
wives of condemned traitors...in camps for 5-8 years.” During the Great Terror, it is estimated 
the NKVD collected 18,000 wives and 25,000 children of those arrested and typically sent them 
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to the gulags.113 Accordingly, “the rule in Stalin’s world was that when a man fell, all those 
connected to him, whether friends, lovers or protégés, fell with him.”114 
Even though the NKVD forced confessions through torture and interrogation, larger 
ideological forces were also at play. Bolsheviks often believed in the righteousness of their Party, 
no matter the circumstances, since the Party was an arbiter of history. In this light, it was 
impossible for the Party to be wrong, even if there were obvious contradictions. As Pyatakov 
remarked about a devout Bolshevik: “There could be no life for him outside the ranks of the 
Party, and he would be ready to believe that black was white, and white was black, if the Party 
required it.”115 Similarly, Trotsky stated: “I know it is impossible to be right against the party. It 
is possible to be right only with the party and through the party, because history has created no 
other paths to the realization of what is right.”116 Some Bolsheviks before the Great Terror 
willingly accepted humiliation by Party accusations as long as they were able to remain 
members.117 As Hannah Arendt pointed out: “So long as the movement exists, its peculiar form 
of organization makes sure that at least the elite formations can no longer conceive of a life 
outside of the closely knit band of men who, even if they are condemned, still feel superior to the 
rest of the uninitiated world.”118 During his trial, to save his life, prove his innocence, and remain 
in the Party, Pyatakov went so far as to ask if he could be “personally allowed to shoot all those 
sentenced to death at the trial.”119 Included in this group was his former wife. 
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 Sometimes, the defendants confessed to such absurd or improbable crimes one has to 
question if the public believed or accepted the results of these show trials. According to sources, 
most Soviet citizens did not trust the admissions of guilt and were confused by the 
proceedings.120 On one occasion, Pyatakov confessed to a meeting with Trotsky in December 
1935 which took place in Berlin. In this rendezvous, Trotsky supposedly laid out the entire 
program the plotters were to follow. Central to the prosecution, this was the only piece of 
evidence of Trotsky’s involvement in the affair. However, a Norwegian newspaper published the 
fact the airport where Pyatakov supposedly had landed for the meeting did not have any civilian 
aircraft arrivals for the entire month of December. In response to the news, the prosecution wrote 
off this glaring hole as more or less a technicality.121 Given the absurdity of the situation, it is 
understandable that the Soviet people for the most part did not believe in the seriousness of the 
confessions. While this may be true, the fact the majority of citizens accepted the results without 
popular appeal hints they held little confidence in each other to stand up to the regime. The 
temptation to yield out of fear or loyalty was far greater.122 Again, this outlook is in part a 
creation of totalitarian societies. If an individual openly doubted the results of the trials, the fear 
someone would report on him or her was ubiquitous. And this fear was exactly what Stalin 
intended. 
  Undoubtedly, Stalin used the terror of the 1930s to consolidate his own power as well as 
establish the permanence of the revolutionary regime. Since Stalin and other leading Bolsheviks 
believed in an historically determined version of Marxism-Leninism, they legitimized the use of 
force and violence by claiming it was for the revolution and the betterment of mankind. They 
                                                          
120 See Conquest, The Great Terror, 110. 
121 See ibid., 151-152. 
122 Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, 353. 
99 
were, in essence, facilitating the development to communism. Through an ideological lens, they 
viewed the world as divided between two competing camps. Therefore, enemies existed 
everywhere, and were constantly changing and threatening to topple the regime. The Bolsheviks 
employed indiscriminate murder to quell these threats and produce a subservient population. In 
1905-1910, the Maximalists and the Anarchists viewed the pre-revolutionary society in a similar 
manner. They used violence to overthrow the tsar and his government, but at the same time 
wielded terrorism as a tool to cleanse the population of enemies and disbelievers. By placing 
people into categories of enemy and friend, the terrorists dehumanized a section of society. They 
then willingly killed indiscriminately for the cause, without feelings of remorse or fear of party 
repercussions.  
 Ideology, and its counterpart religion, have often been used in their extreme to commit 
violent acts. To perpetrate such levels of violence, individuals have typically held a devout belief 
in their cause. In Russia, “the Party justified its “dictatorship” through purity of faith. Their 
Scriptures were the teachings of Marxism-Leninism, regarded as a “scientific” truth.”123 Stalin, a 
revolutionary for life, and a devout believer, justified the murder of millions of people for a goal 
never achieved. On the other hand, through the terror he successfully solidified his own power. 
To institute a violent regime, he surrounded himself with people as equally as ruthless as the 
dictator, but also unquestionably loyal. During 1905-1908, as a Red Brigade leader, Stalin was 
always on the lookout to recruit the cruelest of characters to do his bidding, the ‘cutthroats’ as he 
called them. As the leader of the Soviet Union, he encircled himself with the same type of 
people. The next chapter discusses these individuals and what made them so abhorrent. 
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CHAPTER V: STALIN’S CIRCLE 
Stalin once told his head of the secret police, Genrikh Yagoda, he preferred people to 
support him through fear and not conviction. In the Machiavellian logic, fear was the stronger 
impulse and Stalin knew he could not rely on his men to back him through everything.124 In 
menacing the Russian population throughout the 1930s, he also terrorized those closest to him. 
By using these methods, he created a tight circle of leadership completely devoted and loyal. At 
the same time, this group of individuals shared some of Stalin’s nefarious characteristics; they 
became the henchmen carrying out the terror. The loyalty Stalin demanded from these selected 
Bolsheviks is similar to the requirements of his Mauserist and Red Brigade units in the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Other like traits include a strong sense of paranoia among 
uneducated members willing to use ideology to commit vicious assaults including acts of 
personal vengeance or private gain. 
The group of Bolsheviks leading the country on a new historic course were not the 
typical figure heads of a civilized state. For example, nearly all Politburo members carried guns 
on them at all times.125 This might be more understandable if the Politburo consisted mostly of 
former military veterans, but the majority were not—they were paranoid. At the same time, they 
facilitated an ideology requiring terror to move the Soviet Union towards the new order of 
communism. In the atmosphere of total violence, Stalin’s trusted circle abused the ideology to 
commit atrocities, some of which were of a personal nature. Robert Conquest had no qualms 
calling the leadership “a group of hatchet men” and “truly disgusting characters” who were 
“ready for any violence.”126 He often compared these men to gangsters because of their loyalty 
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and everyday viciousness.127 Molotov himself even once indicated it appeared as if “the 
Politburo was filled with gangsters.”128 Stalin learned in his years before the revolution this was 
the most effective type of individual to implement tasks calling for violence. He carried this 
belief with him as ruler of the Soviet Union.  
While Stalin’s circle consisted of ruthless individuals willing to kill, the reason the 
leadership comfortably applied the methods of terror had to do with Stalin’s encouragement. He 
desired this type of character to do his bidding. In 1905, when forming his Red Brigade units, 
Stalin sought after the ‘hotheads’ the ‘criminal types’ and the ‘cutthroats.’129 He emboldened and 
led this group by calling for “armed uprisings,” “street fighting,” and the creation of “armed 
fighting squads” while denouncing forms of politicking.130 The men in the 1930s, besides having 
a more thorough revolutionary education, were no different. Stalin inspired them to behave in a 
callous and unscrupulous manner. Depending on his mood, he either laughed at their weaknesses 
or pounced on them. Repeatedly, Stalin ordered Molotov and other officials to be more assertive 
by metaphorically “punching people in the face” and to “smash their bones.”131 On the phone 
with Lazar Kaganovich, he once exhorted him to make the terror operation larger and “not to be 
too liberal” in his conduct.132 More than once Stalin compared his terror to Ivan the Terrible’s 
massacre of the boyars. In a conversation with Anastas Mikoyan, Stalin told him, “Ivan killed 
too few boyars. He should have killed them all, to create a strong state.”133 Stalin talked openly 
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about the terror with his inner circle, indicating it was necessary to “finish with our enemies” 
without “looking at their faces.”134 This type of behavior reassured others, some perhaps even 
viler than Stalin, to act in accordance with their instincts. Given they employed ideology to 
justify this conduct, a dangerous situation prevailed. Polikarp Mdivani, while being tortured in 
1937, shouted at the interrogators offering to spare his life if he confessed: “You are telling me 
that Stalin has promised to spare the lives of Old Bolsheviks! I have known Stalin for 30 years. 
Stalin won’t rest until he had butchered all of us, beginning with the unweaned baby and ending 
with the blind great-grandmother!”135 Indeed, Stalin’s own ruthlessness permitted and 
encouraged the mean and malicious in those around him. 
 
The Henchmen Abuse the Ideology 
Of the leadership, Stalin chose Nikolai Yezhov as his right-hand man in implementing 
the terror. Yezhov was the architect behind the Moscow Trials. By numerous accounts of old 
Soviets, Yezhov was said to have had a “repellent personality,” with “low moral qualities” and 
“sadistic inclinations.”136 Boris Nicolaevsky wrote, “Upon looking at him I am reminded 
irresistibly of the wicked urchins of the courts in Rasterayeva Street, whose favorite occupation 
was to tie a piece of paper dipped in paraffin to a cat’s tail, set fire to it, and then watch with 
delight.”137 Some Party members reported women working in the NKVD feared meeting him in 
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the corridors.138 Both Yezhov and Lavrenti Beria, Yezhov’s replacement as head of the NKVD 
in 1939, were the only members of the leadership who actually partook in the torture of 
individuals. The blackjack and the truncheon were two of Beria’s favorite weapons.139 He 
personally took charge of the torture of Nestor Lakoba’s family, an Old Bolshevik acquainted 
with Stalin since his revolutionary underground days in the Caucuses. Beria placed a snake in the 
prison cell of Lakoba’s wife, driving her mad, and he beat their children to death, just mere 
teenagers.140 
Even though not all the loyal Stalinists in leadership positions physically harmed 
individuals by their own hands, they organized aspects of the terror, so long as the foot soldiers 
did the dirty work. Kliment Voroshilov had been a close associate of Stalin’s since the Civil 
War. During the war in Tsaritsyn, he helped Stalin implement the imprisonment and murder of 
Trotsky “specialists.”141 His comrades indicated, “There was something mean about the lips that 
revealed a petulant temper, vindictive cruelty, and a taste for violent solutions.”142 Molotov 
signed off with Stalin on the lists of “enemies” the NKVD and regional officials requested to 
deport, send to the gulags, or murder. Often times he would add names to the list of those he 
wanted to execute.143 In Leningrad, Sergei Kirov “unflinchingly enforced Stalin’s 
collectivization and industrialization policies” resulting in the death of thousands of peasants and 
                                                          
138 See Conquest, The Great Terror, 15.  
139 See Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, 246 and 276. 
140 See ibid., 250. 
141 While in Tsaritsyn in 1918 during the Civil War, Stalin would construct a barge floating in front of Checka 
headquarters that contained Bolshevik enemies. The prison barge slowly filled to a population of 400 or so inmates, 
the majority of which starved to death or were executed following Stalin’s orders. Among those included were ex-
tsarist officers, Serbian officers, SRs, trade unionists, White Guards, and Black Hundred Officers. See Kotkin, Stalin 
Volume I, 302-307. 
142 See Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar, 53. 
143 See ibid., 239. 
104 
workers.144 Kaganovich physically abused his subordinates and had an “explosive temper”145 and 
a “total lack of restraints of humanity.”146 He oversaw the terror of the kulaks and the peasantry 
in its peak years, driving from region to region, making sure local officials met their quotas while 
witnessing the destruction and loss of life firsthand. Throughout the 1930s, he attempted to 
dissuade Stalin from any relaxation of the terror, believing it would lead to his downfall.147 
Similar to the pre-revolutionary terrorists in 1905-1910, leading Bolsheviks used 
ideology in the 1930s to perpetrate violent acts having less to do with the revolution and more 
with personal vengeance or gain. Numerous radicals in the first decade of the twentieth century 
wielded the fervor of the revolution to commit expropriations for their own personal benefit. 
This was particularly true of the Anarchists, who justified their exploits by claiming these actions 
aided in the destruction of capitalist society.148 In the 1930s, while most Bolsheviks expressed 
dedication to the cause, in their push for “naked careerism” many “sought to attach themselves to 
the general secretary.”149 They “jealously protected their position as the elite” and understood “if 
the regime fell, their various privileges and immunities would disappear.”150 Therefore, they 
often acted skeptically, using the terror to remove any potential threats to their power. Once 
Yezhov noticed Beria’s ascension, he attempted to arrest the emerging Bolshevik after feeling 
threatened. As it turned out, Yezhov’s foresight was apt because in the end Beria took his place 
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during Yezhov’s fall. Stalin also sought similar type of men in his Red Brigade and Mauserist 
units. Whether fed up with society or their place in it, they killed because they were told to, and 
received recognition for doing so, in the form of praise from the leadership or monetary 
compensation.  
The leaders of the Great Terror could perpetrate acts of a personal nature because they 
understood certain innocent individuals would be caught in the web of extensive violence. As 
Yezhov once famously stated: “We are launching a major attack on the Enemy; let there be no 
resentment if we bump someone with an elbow. Better than ten innocent people should suffer 
than one spy get away. When you chop wood, chips fly.”151 Similarly, Kaganovich mirrored 
these remarks in stating: “When the forest is cut down the chips fly.”152 The Bolsheviks used this 
type of language throughout their ranks. Thus, individuals across society could abuse the 
ambiguous persecution of citizens to justify murder or other illegal activities without any real 
threat of recourse. In everyday life, police arrested supervisors and kulaks for “wrecking” or 
“sabotage” simply because the workers and peasants coveted their positions and turned them 
in.153 If an employee held a personal distaste for a manager, the simple solution was denounce 
him or her and have them arrested. 
Once again, Stalin’s behavior led the way. There are numerous instances of Stalin using 
the terror to commit personal acts of vengeance. As Nikolai Bukharin once indicated, Stalin 
“cannot help taking revenge of people, on all people but especially those who in any way are 
higher and better than he.”154 In one example, the NKVD arrested and executed Dmitri Shmidt, a 
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tank unit commander in the Army, because of what appeared to be an insult he hurled at Stalin 
once when passing him in the hall. In a half-joking, half-sincere manner, he cursed Stalin and 
told the leader he would one day “lop his ears off.”155 Officially, the NKVD arrested him for 
taking part in the opposition, but no one believed Shmidt had committed any crime. Other 
Bolsheviks similarly used the terror for their personal liking, including Molotov. “He was cruel 
and vengeful, actually recommending death for those, even women, who crossed him.”156 Often 
times, while signing off on NKVD kill lists, Molotov added names of the wives of enemies he 
disliked, effectively penning their execution.157 Beria used the fervor of the terror to settle 
personal scores as well. Such was the case with Alexander Kosarev, whose only crime, similar to 
Shmidt, was insulting the spiteful Bolshevik.158 Once Beria assumed control of the NKVD, he 
brought with him a slew of Georgians, some even convicted murderers, as his lead officials.159 
This could only be reminiscent for Stalin, a Georgian himself, whose gangs composed of 
‘cutthroats’ operated in the Caucuses in 1905-1908.  
Just as Stalin’s circle of leadership capitalized on the nebulous oppression of the terror to 
commit acts of individual violence, so did pre-revolutionary terrorists. “One of the most common 
motives for participating in violent crimes with political overtones” was “a primitive desire for 
immediate revenge.”160 In 1905, a postal worker made an attempt on the life of his superior 
because he treated him poorly and did not pay a fair enough wage. Later that year, a porcelain 
factory worker attacked his shop manager for the same reasons.161 Although their motives were 
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clearly personal, the workers claimed they acted in the name of the revolution. Individuals in 
management or supervisory roles could be threatened for simply being a part of the capitalist 
system.  
Some revolutionaries had no difficulties making the decision to take a life and 
“extremists frequently exhibited unnecessary cruelty bordering on sadism.”162 In 1909, members 
of the Polish Socialist Party mutilated a comrade by cutting off body parts including his nose and 
ears. He died from the torture and his executioners subsequently chopped up the corpse and hid it 
in a chest.163 In a remarkable resemblance, during the Great Terror, Yezhov took charge of the 
interrogation of an old friend turned enemy. He ordered the interrogators first “to cut off his ears 
and nose, put out his eyes, cut him to pieces.”164 A clear example of this type of sadistic 
extremist is Stalin’s closest gangster in 1905-1908, Kamo. He killed without hesitation or second 
thought, and even relished the opportunity to do so. Likewise, one day in 1937, when walking by 
Yezhov in the hall, Khrushchev noticed spots of blood on the NKVD leader’s clothing. Yezhov 
turned to him and informed the future premier, “one should take pride in such specks because 
they were the blood of the Enemies of the Revolution.”165 
 
Bolshevik Loyalty 
Of the traits members of the leadership possessed, Stalin regarded loyalty among the 
highest. Similar characteristics are commonly held in such esteem among “leading gangsters” 
who “nourish a sense of allegiance to the mystique of an organization in much the same way as 
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Yezhov and his colleagues.”166 Often, this loyalty took the form of devout worship of the 
dictator. Like Kamo and his associates idolizing both Stalin and Lenin, Kaganovich’s 
commitment went unquestioned and bordered on adoration. Of the leadership, Molotov 
considered him “the most devoted to Stalin.”167 One evening, Stalin commanded Kaganovich to 
“Get rid of that beard!” an order which he promptly complied with by locating a pair of scissors 
and cutting it then and there.168 Yezhov expressed similar subservience to the despot. “He was 
truly a servant of the regime of personal power who compensated for his low moral and political 
qualities by exhibiting selfless love for, faith in, and devotion to the leader.”169 The terror 
eventually claimed Yezhov as a victim, but before his execution he was said to have had the 
name of Stalin on his lips.170 Likewise, Voroshilov was “usually described as a sniveling coward 
before his master.” 171 And others, such as Valerian Kuibyshev, who died in 1935 from alcohol 
poisoning but was very close to Stalin in the 1920s, did not have any special traits except for his 
“loyalty to Stalin was absolute.”172 Stalin sought and promoted those most devoted to him; 
through this method he acquired absolute power. Beria rose through the ranks to become head of 
the NKVD because of his enthusiastic faithfulness. Comrades described him as “fawningly 
sycophantic,”173 and Svetlana, Stalin’s daughter, called him a “zealot” who treated her father 
“like a Tsar instead of a first comrade.”174 
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Stalin considered Bolsheviks in leadership positions not expressing some level of 
adoration as potential opposition to his rule. Accordingly, he purged them from Party ranks. 
Even the close allies Stalin had promoted through the years had to remain loyal or face arrest and 
execution. At one time a dedicated associate to the leader, because of his defiance Sergo 
Ordzhonikidze fell out of Stalin’s good graces.175 While the relationship deteriorated, 
Ordzhonikidze encouraged the implementation of a plan which eased and thwarted a new wave 
of repression.176 Before he could publicly open an assault against Stalin, however, he 
unexpectedly died. The reasons for his death are questionable at best, but it is plausible Stalin 
had him murdered.177 A similar fate may have befallen Kirov. When alive, Kirov did not hold the 
“streak of malice” common in Stalin’s men, and his popularity challenged the dictator’s 
authority.178 In 1935, the NKVD arrested Avel Yenukidze, the godfather of Stalin’s wife Nadya, 
charging him with leading a terrorist cell. Before his arrest, he had written an article snubbing 
Stalin and failed to embellish his exploits during the Russian Revolution.179 Once he found out 
about the charges brought against him, Yenukidze complained: “What does he want?... I am 
doing everything he has asked me to do but it is not enough for him. He wants me to admit he is 
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a genius.”180 With this simple slip, Stalin questioned Yenukidze’s loyalty, and eventually ordered 
his execution for it. 
Old Bolsheviks were particularly vulnerable if their loyalty appeared to falter in the least. 
They had, after all, witnessed Stalin’s follies and did not see him as the revolutionary hero and 
heir to Lenin the younger generation of loyalists did. Those in the Moscow Trials, such as 
Kamenev, Zinoviev, and Bukharin, were all at one point very close with Stalin. “It did not occur 
to them that their opponent could use the methods of a common criminal” to arrest and frame 
them for crimes they did not commit.181 After Stalin’s wife Nadya took her own life in 1932, 
Bukharin, in a friendly gesture, offered to trade apartments with Stalin since the dismal act had 
occurred in their bedroom. Stalin graciously accepted his offer. In 1938, when the NKVD 
arrested Bukharin, it was this same apartment where they came to collect him.182 Stalin 
eliminated these one-time leaders because they in one way or another provided an immediate or 
potential opposition to the dictator and threatened his power. Therefore, the purges intended to 
bring up new Party leaders wholly devoted to him. Three decades earlier, in 1906, it is on record 
Stalin once ordered Kamo to execute a comrade suspected of stealing from the Party.183 If any of 
his bandits could not be trusted, Stalin had them ousted or murdered. He looked for and attracted 
a particular type of person, exemplified by Kamo, who was reckless, violent, yet unquestionably 
devoted to him. “Those young men followed Stalin selflessly,” and their “admiration for him 
allowed him to impose on them his iron discipline.”184 Those around him acted similarly in the 
1930s and aided him in the implementation of the terror. 
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For a leader looking to attain absolute power in a state, the removal of any opposition 
appears as an obvious step since it represents a direct challenge to his or her supremacy. The 
purge of close supporters expressing nothing but unquestioned loyalty, however, seems less 
obvious. This is true unless, of course, it is looked at as a calculated move, which is exactly what 
Stalin intended with the removal of Yezhov, his trusted executioner and architect of the terror. 
As Hannah Arendt pointed out, if a totalitarian leader “wants to correct his own errors, he must 
liquidate those who carried them out; if he wants to blame his mistakes on others, he must kill 
them.”185 After the conclusion of the Party purges, Stalin terrorized the NKVD. He targeted 
those instrumental in planning and carrying out the extensive terror and replaced them with a 
fresh crop of new loyalists. In this manner, Stalin hid the fact he was the prime force behind the 
violence, and placed the fault and carnage at the feet of others. As such, “throughout the purge 
Stalin had largely avoided public responsibility. And now, when the Terror had gone as far as it 
conceivably could, he could profitably sacrifice the man who had overtly carried out his secret 
orders, the man the Party and public then blamed most.”186 Stalin had Yezhov arrested and 
executed simply because he did his job and did it well.  
 
Bolshevik Paranoia 
Witnessing the downfall of close comrades, paranoia became a central facet of the 
Bolshevik Party. This fear and distrust originally spawned from the fact they achieved power 
through a coup and never held popular support. “Established regimes that rest on a base of 
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general popular acceptance and consensual order do not need to resort to terror.”187 Since this 
was not the case in the Soviet Union, Stalin relied on violence to crush opposition and subdue the 
population. This plan of action meant enemies could be anywhere, at any time, prepared to 
subvert the system. “Indeed the Bolsheviks believed that paranoia, which they called “vigilance,” 
was an almost religious duty.”188 According to the leadership, the combination of two terrorists 
equaled a “conspiracy,” and putting these terrorists from different factions together made a 
“Unified Centre.” These centers existed everywhere and had an international reach.189  
While the results of the Russian Revolution embedded conspiracy into Bolshevik 
ideology and ascension to power, paranoia was also “formed by decades of underground life.”190 
In the first decade of the twentieth century, revolutionary organizations lived in constant distrust. 
This fear more or less had to do with how the Okhrana had infiltrated so many groups and made 
daily arrests of revolutionaries. Stalin himself had been detained at least nine times, and in each 
instance escaped imprisonment or fled exile.191 Mariia Seliuk, a Socialist-Revolutionary who 
attempted an assassination on the director of the police, grew so paranoid by Okhrana 
surveillance she “perceived spies and agents in everyone, including the children of the 
streets.”192 If the revolutionaries caught a spy or traitor, there was little doubt he or she would be 
executed. Radical fighters frequently uttered the phrase ‘a dog’s death to a spy’ to intimidate 
potential agents in the ranks.193 One of the most severe examples of paranoia was Kamo’s 
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attempt to torture all members of the Bolsheviks to ensure they were not spies or cowards.194 If 
they cracked under pressure, a bullet was waiting for them. As Montefiore stated: “The Okhrana 
may have failed to prevent the Russian Revolution, but they were so successful in poisoning 
revolutionary minds that, thirty years after the fall of the Tsars, the Bolsheviks were still killing 
each other in a witch hunt for nonexistent traitors.”195  
 
Lack of Education 
The same as revolutionary terrorists in the first decade of the twentieth century were 
uneducated and had little knowledge of party doctrine, the majority of those in leadership 
positions in the 1930s could not be considered intellectuals in any form of the word. During his 
revolutionary underground days, Stalin understood “street fighting” and “armed uprising” were 
necessary for the revolution, and “only when he is fighting” can a revolutionary make real 
change.196 Accordingly, a firm grasp of the theoretical understanding of socialism was 
superfluous to the fight against the tsar. Anarchist terrorists shared this strong opinion. One 
revolutionary “considered it unnecessary to familiarize himself with the various philosophies, 
because, in his opinion, during a revolution it would simply be more important to act.”197 In his 
memoirs, Boris Savinkov indicated, “that I attach crucial importance to terror,” and volunteered 
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only for tasks which included political assassinations because he perceived general party work as 
less impactful.198 
While Stalin required those around him to study Party doctrine in the 1930s, the majority 
were for the most part uneducated and anti-intellectual. Yezhov’s intelligence “has universally 
been described as low.”199 When filling out a questionnaire, for his educational background he 
wrote “incomplete elementary.”200 Stalin’s secretary, Alexander Poskrebyshev, gave off the 
impression of “being almost totally uneducated.”201 Voroshilov was raised a locksmith and 
completed less than two years of school.202 Kaganovich, often left in charge when Stalin was 
absent from the Kremlin, originally trained as a cobbler and had little primary education.203 
Sergo Ordzhonikidze’s only real education came through informal training as a nurse.204 While 
Molotov had a secondary education, his comrades did not consider him an intellectual by any 
standards. Trotsky liked to joke Molotov was “mediocrity personified,” and Lenin, while 
intended as a compliment but also seen as a slight, called him “the best filing clerk in Russia.”205 
Although the majority of these individuals lacked a formal education, they recognized the 
importance of carrying out orders. And like the earlier revolutionary terrorists, they understood 
to kill you did not need to be an intellectual. 
While the individuals composing Stalin’s circle of leadership cannot be considered 
theoreticians, they all had administrative capacities, a strong work ethic, and a willingness to use 
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these traits to terrorize the population. Stalin expected all Bolsheviks to work long hours and 
spend their free time studying Marx and Lenin.206 Of the leadership, Kaganovich, was considered 
a “worker intellectual,” and his comrades called him “the brains behind the militarization of the 
Party state.”207 He spent countless hours, long into the night, studying in the library and 
educating himself on Party matters. His lack of education showed, however, when he endlessly 
requested Stalin to proofread his work, and Stalin frequently was left “teaching him how to spell 
and punctuate.”208 Even though Molotov took it as an insult when Lenin called him “the best 
filing clerk in Russia,” this characterization was no underestimation of his talent. His comrades 
considered Molotov an “industrious bureaucrat”209 and gave him the nickname “Stone-Arse” for 
his “indefatigable work rate.” 210 Similarly, evaluations of Yezhov’s work typically reference his 
“discipline and his diligence in fulfilling orders.”211 Undoubtedly, this is in part why Stalin chose 
him to head the NKVD during the time of the Great Terror. Andrei Zhdanov, the “sole 
representative in top Party circles of the nineteenth-century educated middle class,” was also a 
“workaholic obsessive.”212 Stalin considered Zhdanov to be a true intellectual, and they worked 
together to re-write the general Soviet history. These leaders operated around the clock, in their 
respective fields, in order to implement Stalin’s version of socialism. 
The similarities between the traits of the criminals who made up Stalin’s Red Brigade 
units and those in his circle of leadership in the 1930s are abundant. Clearly, Stalin trusted this 
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type of individual to follow orders and act with malevolence when the appropriate time came. To 
be certain, he required much more dedication and work from those in the Soviet leadership than 
in his earlier revolutionary days. Even so, he understood what type of men could be trusted to do 
the dirty work he demanded of them. These men were ruthless, uneducated, and undeniably 
loyal. They were paranoid and attacked anyone they perceived as a threat. They justified their 
actions in the name of the revolution, and used its fervor to mask personal objectives or to 
correct grievances. In choosing these individuals to fill positions of leadership, Stalin never left 
the frame of mind formed during his underground revolutionary days. Instead, he demanded 
more of the leading Bolsheviks and required their utmost devotion and enthusiasm, given the 
scope of his end goals had vastly enlarged. 
 
 
 
117 
CONCLUSION 
 Stalin was hardly alone in calling for the use of terror after the Russian Revolution, nor 
was he the first to implement these methods. In fact, “Lenin had spoken of it frankly as an 
instrument of policy.”1 Felix Dzerzhinsky, the head of the All-Russian Extraordinary 
Commission for Combating Counter-Revolution, Profiteering and Corruption (Cheka), stated in 
an interview in 1918: “We stand for organized terror…Terror is an absolute necessity during 
times of revolution.”2 A Bolshevik proclamation in 1918 indicated: “It is necessary to ensure the 
Soviet Republic from class enemies by isolating them in concentration camps; to be shot, all 
persons, touching the White Guard organizations, conspiracies and revolts.”3 During the Civil 
War, the Red Army frequently murdered those perceived as enemies without any trial or legal 
proceeding. Over a two-month time span in 1918, they summarily executed 6,185 Bolshevik 
enemies. This number is significant once compared with the 6,321 death sentences issued by the 
state, not all of which were carried out, between the years 1825 and 1917.4 The Russian historian 
Stephen Kotkin stated: “Faced with extinction, the Bolsheviks wielded the specter of 
“counterrevolution” and the willingness of masses of people to risk their lives defending “the 
revolution” against counterrevolution in order to build an actual state.” At the same time, 
“Bolshevism’s core convictions” driven by ideological determinism, meant “any and all means 
up to lying and summary executions were seen as not just expedient but morally necessary.”5  
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The idea of considering the terror as a “moral necessity” is similarly found a century 
earlier during the French Revolution, when the Jacobins executed over 16,000 individuals by the 
guillotine.6 Robespierre utilized methods of terror in France to quell the counter-revolution and 
to create new and pure citizenry in society. Those in opposition to the revolution, by threat of 
force had to adapt or face elimination. The same as the revolutionaries in France executed King 
Louis XVI and Queen Marie Antoinette, the Bolsheviks murdered the Tsar and his family in 
1918. Without a trial or any charges brought against them, revolutionaries executed the Tsar, his 
wife Alexandra, their son (aged 13) and four daughters, as well as the family physician and three 
servants, by firing squad in the dead of night. The son, Alexei, survived the hail of bullets, and 
the assassins shot him point blank afterwards. Some of the daughters also survived and were 
“bayoneted to pieces.”7 Afterwards, the hit squad poured sulfuric acid over the bodies to disguise 
their identities, then buried them off a dirt road. 
Throughout the Civil War, summary executions continued to take place, with the 
presupposition enemies comprised not only those fighting the Red Army, but any members of 
the bourgeois class or kulaks among the peasantry. “Party thinking equated Bolshevism with the 
movement of history and thereby made all critics into counterrevolutionaries, even if they were 
fellow socialists.”8 The Civil War launched class warfare and the move to socialism to create an 
ideal world. At the same time, the revolutionaries thought executions were only temporary until 
the war was won and the enemies of Bolshevism submitted to the ideology. By the end of the 
war, the Red Terror claimed up to 200,000 victims.9  
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While the Bolsheviks considered the terror a temporary measure, Stalin, the revolutionary 
fighter, understood its influence and impact on society, both to inspire others and silence 
opposition. During the Civil War, in the city of Tsaritsyn, he imprisoned 400 men, consisting 
mostly of Trotsky’s appointed military specialists, on a barge floating near the coast. Of those 
400, the majority starved to death or were executed on Stalin’s orders.10 According to some 
sources, the barge may even have sunk killing all on board.11 Trotsky once wrote: “There is no 
doubt, that Stalin, like many others, was molded in the environment and experiences of the civil 
war, along with the entire group that later enabled him to establish a personal dictatorship.”12 
While this is undoubtedly true, Stalin had already learned these lessons a decade prior. The Red 
Terror during the Civil War was one stepping stone on the way to the Great Terror. 
While the Bolsheviks used the terror in the Civil War to eliminate enemies and secure the 
revolution, Stalin held a deeper understanding of the potential of wielding ideology to commit 
atrocities. He had, after all, witnessed this first hand as a revolutionary fighter in 1905-1908. 
During the Civil War, Stalin “was executing “counterrevolutionaries” without proof or trial, not 
from sadism or panic, but as a political strategy, to galvanize the masses.”13 According to the 
French philosopher Georges Sorel, myths and ideology are far more influential in motivating 
mass movements compared with the appeal to reason.14 And people are willing to act outside of 
the bounds of typical behavior when swayed by emotional appeal and involvement in such an 
undertaking. It seems Stalin had already learned this lesson by the time of the Civil War. The 
Maximalists and Anarchists employed ideology in the first decade of the twentieth century to 
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convince individuals to kill indiscriminately. For the revolutionaries, violence was necessary for 
the creation of a purified society. Stalin understood how the terror not only suppressed the 
opposition, but also inspired others to commit acts they otherwise might not have been willing to 
perform. 
The Great Terror was both a continuation and extension of the terror unleashed during the 
Civil War. There are significant differences, however, between the two. The most important is 
the Great Terror started during conditions of peace and calm, and people, for the most part, had 
accepted the stability of the Soviet regime.15 The Red Terror during the Civil War, on the other 
hand, was implemented immediately following the Revolution after counterrevolutionaries 
threatened to topple the new state. As Nikolai Bukharin indicated: “In 1919 we were fighting for 
our lives. We executed people, but we also risked our lives in the process. In the later period, 
however, we were conducting a mass annihilation of completely defenseless men, together with 
their wives and children.”16  
Stalin legitimized the Great Terror by claiming he was defending the revolution and 
pushing forward his version of socialism. But given the circumstances, it is clear he also did so 
for his own personal power and glory. Ever since he first read the works of Lenin, Stalin revered 
the Bolshevik leader whom he called the Bald Eagle. He worshipped him as one would a hero, 
and thought of himself as Lenin’s true successor. Robert Tucker even contended Stalin initiated 
the terror to ensure his place as the next Lenin.17 Kaganovich once said, “Everyone keeps talking 
about Lenin and Leninism, but Lenin’s been gone a long time…Long live Stalinism.” And Stalin 
                                                          
15 Conquest, The Great Terror, 251. 
16 This quote is taken from Ibid., 22. 
17 See Tucker, Stalin as Revolutionary, 492. According to the author, Stalin constructed the idea of “socialism in one 
country” to build a legacy on par with Lenin’s. And because Stalinism was rejected by a large part of the population, 
particularly the peasantry, he was forced to use measures of terror. 
121 
hastily replied, “How dare you say that…Lenin was a tall tower and Stalin a little finger.”18 
While he feigned modesty in the face of Kaganovich’s sycophancy, Stalin certainly cherished the 
opportunity to be compared in such a light.  
Throughout his political career, Stalin held a desire and need to be perceived as a great 
leader and warrior of the revolution. This is in part the reason he felt he had to re-write the 
history of the Russian Revolution, making himself out to be a champion when in fact he worked 
mostly behind the scenes. At the same time, any perceived faults he wiped clear of the record.19 
The purges of the Party and leadership in the 1930s effectively silenced those who had first 
witnessed his blunders and follies throughout the 1920s. Those having read and heard Lenin’s 
“testament” urging the dismissal of Stalin from the position of General Secretary could no longer 
question his authority. Stalin thus used the ideology for his own personal motives; the same as it 
was used by revolutionaries in the first decade of the twentieth century to seek adventure, steal, 
and kill out of personal desire and pleasure; the same as other Soviet leaders used the terror to 
secure their positions and commit acts of personal gain and vengeance.  
Stalin represents a logical outcome of the Bolshevik ideology and its violent deployment. 
This is not to conclude the terror was an inevitable result of the ideology; however, all of the 
ingredients mixed perfectly for this to occur. Once in power, Stalin used his position to 
implement a policy of terror which was more or less called for three decades earlier by the 
Maximalists: the difference being the earlier revolutionaries did not have the bureaucracy to 
implement the violence on such a massive scale. Instead, they led individual terrorist campaigns 
with the weapons available to them. Stalin, a true persona of the revolutionary underground, was 
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first and foremost a radical fighter. After all, he once stated: “The victory of the people must be 
achieved mainly in the street, by street fighting and not by the Duma, not by talking in the 
Duma.”20 In a 1905 call to workers, he remarked: “Not empty phrases, not senseless ‘self-
arming,’ but real arming and an armed uprising,” this alone can “lead to the defeat of the 
government.”21 It is clear at this point Stalin was more comfortable as a street fighter and soldier 
for the revolution than as a theoretician. Once coming to power, he wielded the necessary levers 
to make the ideological rants of the past a reality. 
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